

THE DANGERS
of
BEING HUMAN



We actually do behave towards children as if they were possessed of the Devil, and as if it were our duty to drive this Devil out.

THE DANGERS
of
BEING HUMAN

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With an Introduction by

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PREFACE

SCIENCE AND BROADCASTING

THIS book is based on the original drafts of a series of broadcasts on the relation of Psycho-analysis to our existing social order. These were subsequently shortened to meet the time requirements of the B.B.C. The whole of the section on Politics and a number of paragraphs in the War talk were omitted at the express desire of the Talks Executive. In this abbreviated form the series was published in the *Listener*. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. J. S. A. Salt of the Talks Department, who acted throughout in an advisory capacity. His unremitting attention, together with his intuitive grasp of the difficulties that beset anyone who lectures on the 'psychology of the unconscious,' added very considerably to the pleasures of broadcasting.

* * *

I am bound to confess that when first I was invited to broadcast on the relation of psycho-analysis to social problems I could not sufficiently admire the hardihood of the B.B.C.'s Talks Department. Psycho-analysis at the best of times is not a particularly popular form of science. It arouses a considerable amount of opposition, especially amongst those whose knowledge of the subject is limited to the information

that it is a form of mental investigation. Man is extremely jealous of the inviolability of his mind. Moreover it has to be admitted that since psycho-analysis is concerned mainly with the content of the unconscious mind, any conclusions it may have to offer regarding social problems are liable to be at least unfamiliar if not indeed unpalatable. We are so accustomed to regard ourselves as rational creatures that we resist vigorously any suggestion that our minds are influenced by irrational fears and superstitions. Realizing this strength of these emotional barriers I welcomed the opportunity of proving that there is nothing inherently frightening about analytic views. It did not occur to me that in the middle of the actual series I should find myself involved in a typical conflict between the need for scientific truth and the inexpediency of telling it.

The actual situation could scarcely have been foreseen either by the Talks Department or by myself. When the preliminary drafts were made there was no immediate prospect of a war between Italy and Abyssinia and for that matter no likelihood of the General Election which took place shortly after the talks had been drafted. There did not appear to be any need for reserve in discussing the relation of psycho-analysis to social problems: apart of course from the discretion which is necessary when doctors speak or write on medical subjects to a lay audience. But as it happened the talk on

War was given shortly after Great Britain had become involved, along with some other nations, in the project of applying economic sanctions to Italy. The talk on politics fell due in the thick of the General Election. This was distinctly awkward. Political leaders had just given or were about to broadcast characteristic addresses. Mr. Baldwin had already struck his familiar note of sweet and solid reasonableness. Lord Snowden in his best pamphleteering vein had made a 'slashing attack' in all directions at once. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had not yet spoken but could be depended on to emphasize with his usual fervid conviction the gravity of the issues before the Nation. In the midst of all this emotional declamation it would have been positively unseemly to obtrude my conviction that "one of the healthiest signs of post-war life is the degree of contempt into which politics and political leaders have fallen."* Not only unseemly but no longer quite true. For during a general election the electors are usually so stirred by the emotional manœuvres of organizers that they are inclined to forget their earlier contempt for political marching and counter-marching.

The same arguments can be applied to the problem of broadcasting a talk on war during a war crisis. It is all very well to speak of savage rituals and superstitions when the subject under discussion

is, shall we say, the origin of modern hygienic fads. But it is not so easy to talk freely about savage rituals in warfare, when at that moment a state of war exists between an ostensibly civilized European nation and a conglomeration of East African tribes. Presumably many listeners were already sympathetic to the Abyssinian cause. These would not be likely to listen with patience to a description of the more primitive rituals of war as conducted amongst savages. It would have been regarded as hitting the Abyssinians below the belt. Yet unless one is thoroughly conversant with these anthropological data it is impossible to discuss war problems objectively. And this difficulty is small compared with the difficulty of examining the relations of peace to pacifism and the League of Nations. Europe was at the time resounding with sonorous phrases about the League and Peace. The British Foreign Secretary stating his Government's position at Geneva had formally struck the rostrum three times. At the end of a characteristic speech by M. Laval he had jumped up to shake that astute minister warmly by the hand. Small presages of storm no doubt. But when an Englishman so far overcomes his inhibitions as to gesticulate before foreigners, you may be certain that there is something afoot. Obviously the National Government, for whatever reason, had made up its mind to invest openly if not heavily in the League idea. And as you can well

realize, when a Government officially decides that a state of crisis exists the rights of individuals to express themselves freely on that pet idea are likely to be severely curtailed at any moment.

It is all the more credit to the B.B.C. that in the midst of a war-crisis it should have allowed anyone to analyse freely not only the unconscious motivations of war but the unconscious motivations of peace and pacifism. And only naturally at this point the issue of discretion in broadcasting became acute. The B.B.C., like the human mind, serves three masters. It must respect the views of those authorities who have the power to alter its charter; it must in the long run pay due regard to the prevailing temper of listeners and it must try to live up to its own ideals of broadcasting. When two of these masters would, if they cared to listen, object to the trend of a talk, it seems obvious that ideals of scientific objectivity must go by the board. It is all very well to accuse the B.B.C., as many intellectuals do, of timidity or intellectual dishonesty. To begin with it wouldn't be at all surprising if the B.B.C. were in a perpetual state of panic. It has to withstand criticism from all directions and nothing is more calculated to send an individual into a panic than feeling that he is a butt for universal criticism. Many apparently stable individuals break down under such circumstances. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that the B.B.C. actually performs a

therapeutic function for the nation. By acting as a universal Aunt Sally it draws off some of the blind hostilities of the group. Moreover, the B.B.C. cannot reasonably be expected to excel the ordinary newspaper in objectivity. Like the newspaper it must hold up a mirror to man; and man as we know only tells the truth occasionally. I do not mean that man is an inveterate liar: simply that he prefers half-truths which are palatable to whole truths which are usually unpalatable. In any case the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is really a legal fiction intended to sooth the uneasy consciences of lawyers and judges. In medical practice it is left to the doctor's discretion whether he tells the whole truth to his patient or withholds part of it. It may be wrong to tell it, it may be wrong not to tell it. Summing this all up we may say that whatever its ideals of broadcasting may be, the B.B.C. under existing circumstances is compelled to adopt a good deal of medical discretion in disseminating scientific truths.

Anyhow, the talk on war was finally sent in shorn of all topical illustrations which might annoy Government executives, administrative committees or listeners with strong bellicose or pacifist convictions, such for example as members of the League of Nations Union. But censorship, like all forms of fear, has a habit of thriving on its own energies. By this time the currents of political feeling had begun to

move. Not that the electorate was unduly excited. Only the leaders, in accordance with established custom, were lashing their tails in a provocative manner, whilst Political journalists in the process of recording this fictitious excitement were beginning to catch it themselves. This process, once started, is difficult to stop. There was in fact a reasonable chance that by the time the talk on politics fell due, these time-worn devices would have succeeded in their purpose of rousing some enthusiasm and counter-enthusiasm in a not too mercurial electorate.

Profiting by earlier experience and advice I took the precaution of altering the original draft of the talk on politics, cut all allusions to current events and expressed my readiness to substitute illustrations from nineteenth-century politics, from French politics, or for that part from Chinese politics of A.D. 1000. And with that I hoped for the best. After all it did not seem likely that anyone would bother very much about the political views of an unknown medical psychologist; more particularly since I had made it abundantly clear that I had not much to say for any political party. But to no avail. The moment was unpropitious. The political broadcast was banned lock, stock and barrel. Realizing the embarrassing situation of the B.B.C. I offered to substitute a talk which would contain no references to politics but deal solely with the

relation of fundamental psychological laws to social organization. To ensure that no current political allusions were intended, I suggested the title 'A Psycho-analyst's Utopia: a Thousand Years On.' This was accepted.

I have described these events in some detail for two reasons. I wish to make it clear that I am entirely in sympathy with the embarrassing situation of the B.B.C. I believe that under existing conditions, that is to say when the B.B.C. is legally subservient to the Administration of the day and intimidated by the emotional needs of listeners, it has no alternative but to censor, and to censor on the safe side, that is to say severely. Political critics of the B.B.C. who are constantly on the alert to detect Right or Left swings in the Talks Department are really not in a very strong position. For one thing, if the same critics were in power they would certainly continue the system in their own favour. As for the view that scientific truths should be broadcast irrespective of the emotions of executives or listeners, that is under existing circumstances a preposterous suggestion. As things stand it is no part of the B.B.C.'s function to broadcast the scientific truth. It may do so whenever it sees a suitable opportunity, but it is not under any obligation to do so. Sometimes it is under obligation not to do so.

Nevertheless the time is approaching when the functions of the B.B.C. will bring to a head the

conflict between empirical science and political art. For the moment politicians hold the most important strategic positions. Scientists have neglected what should have been one of their main concerns, the transmission of accurate information to lay audiences. Naturally they are compelled to take a back seat just when accurate information is most to be desired. And it is cold comfort to reflect that politicians have been in effect ousted from the control of other national Institutions such as the British Museum. The truths exposed to our gaze at the British Museum are not subject to careful censorship, and they are as stark as any that might be broadcast. But they are not given the same publicity. Only those who search will find them. There is for example a special index in the Museum Library access to which can only be secured by qualified persons. On the other hand the Museum telephone wires do not get red hot with complaints about the nudity of marbles, the indecency of mummy cases or the political significance of Ancient Egyptian Proclamations. The freedom of display granted the Museum is infinitely greater than the freedom of expression granted the B.B.C. by public or governmental authority. Yet though few will deny that the truths of empirical science should take precedence over political expediency, there appears little or no immediate hope that the machinery of the B.B.C. will be captured by empirical scientists.

I agree of course that scientists have only themselves to blame. Not only have they neglected their duties in the matter of communicating information but they have laid themselves open to a damaging retort from the politician. The latter may claim that even if he keeps his ear close to the ground listening to the rumbles of popular opinion, he avoids thereby copying the mistake of the scientist whose head is usually in the clouds. He might even add that objective statements on matters of public policy cannot be left with safety to the scientist, so long as scientists show an over-readiness to embrace extreme views in politics. The criticism is not without foundation. It may be natural for economists to lean to the Left on the ground that any preconceived plan of social organization, however faulty, is better than none. But that a large proportion of intellectuals should tie themselves to any form of political extremism does more credit to their hearts than to their heads. However just this criticism may be, there is little doubt that the scientist has ultimately the stronger claim to broadcasting authority. The case for freeing the B.B.C. from emotional intimidation can scarcely be disputed. The rights of politicians to free expression should not of course be curtailed, but no political considerations should be allowed to influence the presentation of sociological and psychological views so long as these are not positively obscene or seditious. If this aim could

be achieved, if the irrational influences brought to bear on the executive could be eliminated, the B.B.C. would become an invaluable medium for transmitting accurate information on the most vital of human problems. Its influence on the transmission of culture and thereby on the advancement of civilization would be incalculably great. A first step in the direction of securing control would be the appointment of representatives of these sciences, not simply to Advisory Boards where they are quite impotent, but to the Central Governing Body. The issues at stake are quite vital. Shall the oracles of the future be stage managed by politicians, are they to be intimidated by the emotional needs of Everyman, or can they without neglecting the legitimate requirements of either group give expression to the truths of empirical science?

INTRODUCTION

BY THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O.

SOME people think that because medical psychology is a favourite subject with cranks, which is true, it is itself a cranky subject, which is not true. Others strongly object to Freud's unpleasant complexes. Well, you are not to hear about these in this series of broadcast talks. Your lecturer is himself a Freudian, but he is not going to inflict anything disagreeable upon you.

What are my qualifications to give this introductory address? They are very small. I am, as you know, not a doctor. But when I was in London I was on the Council of the Institute of Medical Psychology, formerly called the Tavistock Clinic, and I know something about their methods—indeed I have sent them several patients who came to consult me about mental troubles.

Psychology and the Psyche

I am not myself a Freudian. Freud seems to me to give us psychology without a psyche, and to give too much attention to morbid states instead of investigating the healthy mind. I think he suffers himself from an obsession about sex, and I regard this as a misfortune, because surely there is a ten-

dency to exaggerate enormously the place which sex plays in a normal healthy life. Most people think far more about their work and their play, about earning money and spending it, about their families and their friends, than they do about sex. Lastly, I am sure he is wrong in regarding religion as an illusion. His rival Jung is wiser, since he sees clearly that religious faith is a cure in many neurotic cases. Jung will say to a patient, "You are suffering from loss of faith in God and a future life." "But, Dr. Jung, do you believe that these doctrines are true?" "That is no business of mine, I am a doctor, not a priest. I can only tell you that if you recover your faith you will get well; if you don't, you won't." Well, I think myself that if the diagnosis is correct, the patient would get more help from a convinced believer. Still, Jung's experience is very interesting.

Homo Sapiens

Your lecturer is to speak on 'The Dangers of Being Human.' Man, who began as an ape afflicted with megalomania, is now essentially a savage who fancies himself civilized. Hence the danger. He calls himself *homo sapiens*, a title which he has done little to earn. His real tastes are those of a savage, suitably watered down.

How does he spend his free time? In playing at those occupations which are the serious business of a savage. He kills wild animals: he shoots, hunts,

and fishes. He dances, or rather shuffles lugubriously about a room. He attends tribal feasts, and overeats himself. He picks up sides and indulges in a sham battle with a football. His religious worship—well, he has an organ instead of a tom-tom or bull-roarer; but the idea is the same. So far, not so bad. To turn work into play, combativeness into sport, fetish-worship into decorous religion—there is nothing here to object to. We only note that the sophisticated savage has much the same tastes as the primitive.

But look at the fashions. The savage woman puts a ring through her nose; the civilized lady through her ears. The Chinese ladies used to bind their feet; the civilized lady puts every organ of her body out of shape by high heels. The Hottentot beauty prides herself on projecting portentously behind—steatopygia is the scientific name; the post-War English girl tries to obliterate all the curves in which female beauty consists.

Our modern art and jazz music are so frankly savage in their inspiration that no more need be said about them.

And what are we to say of our politics? Rabin-dranath Tagore, the Indian sage, thus describes his visit to Chicago: "American democracy makes a deliberate study of the dark patches in the human intellect, wherewith to help itself to create an atmosphere of delusion through hints, gestures, yells, and startling grimaces, for the purpose of stupefying the

popular mind. When I was in Chicago I saw everywhere on the town walls one single name blazoned in big letters in an endless round of repetition, like the whirlwind monotony of a dervish dance that dazes one's mind into vacuity. Evidently the name belonged to some candidate for political election. But what an insult to the people, who are supposed to represent the supreme power in their government, openly to apply to them the spell of hypnotism in place of reason, as the medicine-man does in the heart of Africa!' Are we more rational than the Yankees? We shall soon see, when the General Election comes on. The herd instinct makes men follow each other like sheep through a fence. One dog barks at nothing; the rest bark at him. The crowd is quite capable of plunging into an abyss, like the Gadarene swine.

Fanaticism and War

Suggestibility is one of the subjects which the psychologists study carefully. Its strength is terrible. Fanaticism, whether religious or political, is just this submerging of reason by obsession with one ideal which induces a kind of monomania. The normal result is furious hatred and cruelty. The crimes of fanaticism are the most revolting that history records, and some of the worst examples have been quite recent.

Many of these atavisms come together to produce

the strangest of all savage survivals—War. It has been proved up to the hilt that war is an anachronism, a crime, a folly, a monstrous blunder. Next to losing a war, the greatest misfortune is to win one. And yet at the beginning of a war a nation is swept off its feet by enthusiasm, and an appeal is made, not in vain, to all the noblest motives in human nature. The causes of war cannot be studied too carefully by psychologists. All the great problems are raised. Many of you will remember Mr. Aldous Huxley's broadcast last year on the causes of war. They are complex, and not mainly economic but psychological. War strengthens the ties that bind the individual to the group and heightens his sense of group solidarity to the point of intoxication. It dignifies routine with the name of patriotic work. It begets and justifies all manner of emotional excitement. It baptizes with the sacred name of patriotism all the anti-social tendencies which we have been taught to repress. 'The barbarian and the unconscious sadist are strong within us.' Personally I should give more emphasis to the response which a good and brave man makes to a call for self-sacrifice. 'Who dies, if England lives?' But we are all agreed now (it was not so forty years ago, and this we have no right to forget) that we want to banish war from the world; and we are surprised that Mussolini refuses to believe in our disinterestedness, of which we are entirely convinced.

Can Savage Survivals be Eliminated?

Well, all this sounds like a satire on our boasted civilization. But our lecturer has a very practical object, to guide us to more sensible methods of social reform. We shall listen to the constructive part of his talks with great interest. He wishes us first to recognize the savage in ourselves and others—I have shown that the savage is only a very little way below the surface. But what next? Tennyson tells us to 'let the ape and tiger die.' But they do not seem at all inclined to die; and if we could kill them, we should still have to deal with the donkey, a more intractable animal.

I think our first rule must be never to exploit the savage in others. This, if we think it out, will carry us a long way. How much of the evil in the world is co-operative guilt with limited liability, unscrupulous use of others' faults? Think, for instance, of the Crucifixion, and the use made by the Chief Priests of the weak points in Pilate, Judas, and the mob.

Next, a practical reformer must allow for the savage in human nature—and the savage is not a very bad fellow after all. We must take human nature as it is if we want to make the best of it. And man is a complex creature. He is not religious only, as the leaders in the seventeenth century thought, nor only rational, as the eighteenth century thought,

nor only nationalistic, as he appeared during much of the nineteenth, nor only economic, as many now are trying to write history. The real man is, and always was, something different from any of these; his real springs of action are being laid bare by psychology—or so the students of that science would have us believe.

The lecturer will lay great stress on getting hold of the young, the younger the better. How he will fit this into the dangers of being human I must leave him to explain. He would like to begin to look after the child almost as soon as it is born, and he will tell you that parents and schoolmasters make every conceivable mistake. I daresay we do, but I console myself with the thought that with all our best efforts we cannot do our children much harm. To take the child at birth is to take him too late. We must choose his grandparents judiciously, and all will be well. The Chinese, when a man had distinguished himself, used to ennoble not his descendants, who cannot have had any share whatever in his success, but his ancestors, who probably had a great deal. How pleasant to think that if we have a really eminent grandson, we may be raised to the peerage after we are dead!

Disillusionment and Religious Belief

I have been trying to follow a line of thought which is not quite familiar to me. I sympathize with

the modern wish to know ourselves through and through, even the unconscious part of ourselves. The modern man is not at all satisfied with himself. The heir of all the ages fears that he is, in Jung's words, the worst conceivable disappointment of the hopes of human kind. Modern man has had an almost fatal shock, and has fallen into profound uncertainty. He looks within, and finds some very ugly inmates—an earlier psychology would call them evil spirits. He has lost faith both in religion and politics, and he takes up all kinds of pathetic superstitions which bring him no comfort. It is a wholesome reaction against the shallow and vulgar philosophy of the nineteenth-century optimists, and I believe good will come of it. Freud teaches us to look within, and to find there only "whited sepulchres full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness." Have not the saints known this always? "Behold I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin hath my mother conceived me." But "thou shalt purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean; thou shalt wash me and I shall be whiter than snow." I am convinced that a psychoneurotic patient who can say from his heart, "I believe in the Holy Spirit" will often get rid of his trouble, really and not only in imagination. For I believe myself that all this evil heritage can be got rid of by the indwelling presence of the Spirit of God.

One word in conclusion to my own profession.

Jung says, "My own writings were seriously studied in Rome long before any Protestant pastor thought them worthy of a glance." This, if it applies to my own Church, is very wrong and very foolish. The clergyman of the future must be a physician of the soul, or he will be of very little use in the Church of the future.

THE DANGERS OF BEING HUMAN

I

THE COST OF BECOMING CIVILIZED

THE position of psycho-analysis to-day is somewhat similar to that of electrical science in the days of our great-grandmothers. Although in those times knowledge of electrical forces had already been turned to advantage in the form of various practical appliances, most people were inclined to regard these instruments as rather ingenious toys. And in fact the more daring among Victorian adolescents used to extract considerable satisfaction from making father ring a bell when he sat down in his armchair. Only a few workers in the field had any conception that the applications of electrical science would one day revolutionize the everyday life of nations. The same is true of psycho-analysis to-day. Though for many years now it has been in daily use as a method of mental treatment, yet most people still think of it as a kind of parlour trick in somewhat dubious taste. And indeed there are zealous amateurs to spare who enjoy making the flesh of their more impressionable friends creep by pretending to interpret their dreams or daily conduct. Nevertheless,

a few workers in the field cannot refrain from turning over in their minds possible applications of psycho-analytic science to the development of man and of man's social structure. It is the purpose of this series of talks to put before you some of these reflections for what they are worth.

To avoid misunderstanding I ought to begin by explaining what is meant by the term 'psycho-analysis.'* Psycho-analysis is essentially a theory of mind. Dr. Inge told you last week that in his opinion Freud had given us a psychology without a psyche. Now I don't quite know what he means by psyche. But if he means what the scientist means, namely, the total activity of mind, then I am afraid Dr. Inge has, with the best of intentions, led himself astray. On the contrary, psycho-analysis has incurred a considerable degree of unpopularity just because of its persistent determination to explore the workings of the human psyche. However it is not my intention to argue the evidence on which psycho-analytic conclusions are based. My aim is simply to consider how far the actual discoveries made by

* In case there should be any confusion as to the relation of psycho-analysis to other forms of medical psychology or psycho-therapeutics, I might add that the term is applied exclusively to the scientific views and methods of treatment advanced by the International Psycho-analytic Association, and its branches. The only body qualified to represent this association in England is the British Psycho-analytical Society, and the only Institute where psycho-analytical methods are employed or taught is the London Institute of Psycho-analysis.

Freud and his followers throw light on the complex social structure of man.

Preoccupations with Death and Destruction

Possibly the title of the series, 'The Dangers of Being Human,' may strike you as rather fanciful, even sinister. So I suggest that we begin straightaway, as all good doctors do, by quoting some illustrative cases. Consider, for example, the somewhat pitiful situation of Mr. A. B. who suffered from compulsions which necessitated his living in the most remote solitude in the country. He was first stricken with his aberration in a London suburb. He became unable to endure existence here for a number of reasons of which I shall give only two. In the first place, should the grass of his garden plot blow over into his next-door neighbour's garden, he felt sure that by a roundabout route this would cause his neighbour's death. The grass would be burned in the usual bonfire: the ashes would then be spread on the soil, infect the vegetables, and ultimately poison the neighbour. On the other hand should the grass from the neighbour's garden spray over into his the situation was equally dangerous: he had only to collect a handful surreptitiously and burn it in his ashpit. Inevitably his neighbour would die.

Consider now the peculiar habit of Mr. X. Y. On some occasions Mr. X. Y. would gather leaves from

a certain plant and set them on fire, so that the smoke would blow into the house of a resident in a nearby village. Or, again, take the case of Mr. Y. Z. who at times would gather leaves from a bush which a neighbouring villager had brushed against, take them home and subject them to a special form of treatment. In both instances the idea was that the neighbouring villager should die. You will observe that there is a close resemblance between the preoccupations of Mr. A. B. and those of both Mr. X. Y. and Mr. Y. Z. The main difference is that whereas Mr. A. B. struggled violently against his compulsive ideas, both Mr. X. Y. and Mr. Y. Z. gave rein to them. And this was only natural because, whilst Mr. A. B. was a highly intelligent and despite appearances sane resident in a respectable garden suburb, Mr. X. Y. and Mr. Y. Z. were sorcerers living in different parts of the Archipelago of New Guinea, where they practised black magic for a consideration.

Now let us stop for a moment to draw some provisional conclusions from our cases. If we can prove that civilized man is subject to the same primitive habits of mind as the so-called untutored savage we have opened up a vista of possibilities. Suppose, for example, that instead of being Mr. Smith of, shall we say, Surbiton, it were Lord Smith of the Foreign Office, educated at Eton and Oxford, who suffered from these secret preoccupations with

death and destruction, we should quite justifiably be terrified to think that Lord Smith occupied a position of power. If, watching the progress of an Australian black-fellow down Whitehall, armed with spear and bull-roarer, we were told that this primitive savage was Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, most of us would experience surprise, if not positive alarm. We certainly should not wish him to be entrusted with the handling of a European crisis. Yet the curious fact remains that, in an age when examinations have become a positive fetish, no country in the world takes the trouble to examine the mental stability of its statesmen and administrators. So long as they look comparatively sane and are good party men we simply trust to luck for the rest.

Perhaps you may feel that this is not a very convincing example of the dangers of being human. People vary very much in the range of their interests and apprehensions. Some are acutely sensitive to social danger and comparatively indifferent to individual danger. Others have literally no interest in social affairs, however threatening the circumstances may be; a fact of some importance in assessing the war-readiness of any population. If the idea of a dangerously neurotic Foreign Secretary leaves you unperturbed, think how you would feel if your doctor, your lawyer, or your stockbroker suffered from neurotic obsessions. Would you feel safe if your

financial affairs were entrusted to a broker whose unconscious fears or inhibitions prevented him being successful on the Stock Exchange. What if he were one of those unconsciously guilty people who can only placate their concealed antagonism by losing their clients' money? Would you like it if your physician suffered from the obsession that sick people cure themselves and can safely be left to their own recuperative resources in a dangerous emergency? What if your lawyer were emotionally incapable of defending your interests efficiently?

You will no doubt argue that dangers of this sort cannot be very frequent since the number of those suffering from extreme neurotic obsessions such as afflicted Mr. A. B. must be small. And although this number has been vastly underestimated, largely because most people are at pains to conceal their peculiarities, there is something to be said for the argument. It is true that in democratic countries, at any rate, the more obvious abnormalities of administrators are liable to be detected. It is no longer likely that the Foreign Policy of a democratic country will be influenced by a ruler's excessive fondness for young handsome men as was the case with James I and the Duke of Buckingham. Yet the implication that a person who shows no very obvious peculiarity in conduct is necessarily mentally stable and dependable is radically unsound, and has been responsible for many national misfortunes.

The more one studies the minds of apparently normal people, the more clear it becomes that under the surface man presents the same mental equipment as his ancestors of ten thousand years ago. In case this should appear recklessly abusive it should be added that those who take pride in the high level of their civilization are free to reverse the statement. They can say that, considering how primitive man's instinctual inheritance is, it is remarkable how well he conceals it from his fellow creatures. And this is quite true.

Irrational Fear in Daily Life

With a little practice in observation, however, it is possible to establish that few of us spend more than half an hour out of the twenty-four in a completely rational state of mind. This, you may say, is an outrageous libel. The average person spends at least eight hours a day earning his daily bread. Surely he is acting rationally throughout this prolonged period! I am quite ready to admit that a large number of the automatic actions man carries out when in process of earning his daily bread are apparently sensible. On the other hand a considerable number are not. And the fact that as a rule we are compelled to be sensible about our working actions does not imply that our state of mind during the same period is rational. But even if for the sake of argument we exclude professional activities it can

be shown that the rest of his waking hours consist of a series of thoughts, actions and emotions which, subjected to the slightest analysis, prove to be for the most part either openly irrational or unaccountable. The Western European, reading of the peculiar taboos and magical precautions observed by primitive tribesmen, is apt to plume himself on his own enlightenment. Yet there are few of his actions which are not governed by precisely the same systems of thought as exist amongst savage tribes. As newspaper advertisements clearly show, this is an age of hygienic precaution. Yet the multitude of food fads and antipathies—a passionate devotion to orange juice, for example, or a passionate aversion from alcohol; the innumerable precautions about cleansing, cooking and eating; the solicitous regulation of body-functions—all of which absorb a vast amount of human energy, owe more to savage forms of fear than to rational laws of hygiene. The customer who secretly cleans his fork or spoon under the restaurant table is moved by precisely the same anxieties as the savage who carries out purification rituals over his cooking pot to ward off the poisonous influence of evil spirits. The main difference is that the civilized frequenter of restaurants has completely lost touch with the reasons for his action and offers us instead a more or less plausible explanation, which incidentally he is ready to defend with the utmost heat. Indeed, there is hardly a routine pro-

cedure from dressing to switching off the light at bedtime which is not regulated by superstitious belief. The number of those who step over cracks in the pavement has never been accurately estimated, but it is certainly enormous. It is equalled only by the number of those who step on cracks to prove that they are not compelled to step over them. And although ladder superstitions seem to have lost some of their urgency nowadays, their place has simply been taken by more up-to-date superstitions. As a race we are slowly becoming more and more hypochondriacal, that is to say we develop exaggerated anxiety about the state of our bodies. Our skins are only recovering from the overdoses of ultra-violet rays they were given at the seaside last summer. And behind all this mass hypochondria can be found lurking the same magical idea which lies behind the more obvious superstitions, namely, to ward off or cure evil.

The Head Hunters of Europe

In case you should think these conclusions are merely psycho-analytical whimsies I should like to add that long before Freud published any of his work, some anthropologists had already arrived at similar conclusions. You have no doubt heard of head-hunting cannibals who, having cut off the heads of enemies, cure them and display them as trophies. Now already in the pre-Freudian days

one observer drew attention to the fact that various substitutes for the head could be noted. For example, the castrated organs of the enemy were preserved, and at a different stage of evolution the head of his horse. And he concluded that still later practices, such as collecting deer heads or antlers or preserving the hair, were part and parcel of the human-trophy system. Modern analytic investigation has confirmed these conjectures. It is now known that this process of substitution, whereby new objects can be used to deflect primitive impulses, has come to involve the most simple and conventional activities of everyday life. Sporting trophies are still displayed on the walls of our country houses. The practice of preserving locks of hair, sometimes nail cuttings of absent or departed friends has not yet fallen into disuse. Many mothers still keep the first teeth shed by their first-born in a secret bureau drawer. And in some countries, as you know, the custom persists of collecting tears in suitable bottles. In these instances of course the aim of the original impulse is not very closely disguised. More effectively disguised forms can be observed in the activities of the autograph hunter. The habit of collecting signed photographs has the same origin, although nowadays a good deal of this enthusiasm has been displaced from photograph to stamp albums and to collections of cigarette cards.

It would be interesting to consider the animistic

ideas lurking behind these processes of substitution, the fact, for example, that the unconscious aim of the photograph collector is to acquire virtue, to keep his friends alive, to share their qualities and at the same time to protect himself from the unconscious guilt of having caused their destruction. My immediate concern is simply to indicate that the same primitive processes which existed in the darkest phases of man's development are still active in modern civilized man. You may say of course that these modern substitutes are quite harmless, merely vestigial remains like the tail of man. But it is not at all infrequent to meet with primitive forms amongst highly cultured individuals: for example, a woman who took a solicitous interest in a friend's appendix, arranged to have her operated on, preserved the appendix and treated the trophy with the most surpassing affection, only disturbed every now and then by atavistic impulses to eat it. If any doubt should remain in your minds I recommend you to study the play of small children who have not been intimidated by their parents. Every now and then you can observe the young Englishman start his morning's campaign by tearing up a picture book, go on to disembowel a doll or cut the tail off the rocking-horse, at the same time informing all and sundry that he is a giant carving and swallowing his baby brother.

You may still insist that all this is very harmless ;

that taking him all round modern man does not abandon himself to orgies of destruction. As far as individual man is concerned we are bound to admit that with a few macabre exceptions this is quite true. On the other hand when we come to observe the habits of groups it is easy to show that life is disturbed every now and then by outbursts of inconceivable ferocity. So long as these occur we cannot plume ourselves too much on the individual aspects of our civilization. The fact is that we cannot assess the efficiency of processes of substitution unless we draw an accurate balance sheet of man's activities, setting off his social aggressiveness against his individual inhibitions. All the evidence available goes to show that man is no less dangerous an animal than he was in prehistoric times. Indeed there is much to be said for the view that he is more dangerous, inasmuch as he has abandoned some of the savage's ritualistic control of killing. Not only does he exterminate his natural enemies without a moment's hesitation, but he is capable of ruthlessly exterminating his friends. On a considerable number of occasions he does not stop short of exterminating himself.

Sources of Evidence

Although I have chosen a number of illustrations from anthropological sources, I ought to add that conclusions about man's irrationality are not based

solely on this evidence. Two other sources of information are available. We can study the disintegration products of mind, that is to say, the ideas, emotions and behaviour of man when his mind has broken down under stress: and we can study the ideas, emotions and behaviour of man before his mind is fully formed. During the past thirty years psycho-analysis has been able to uncover some of the secrets lying behind those states of mind that are commonly called insane. In particular the study of delusions of persecution has shed considerable light on the deeper layers of the mind. Here we find individuals, frequently of a high order of intelligence, who have peopled the world with imaginary enemies against whom they defend themselves with all the skill that rage and fear can induce. In short their minds are governed by precisely the same animistic reactions which we observe in the case of the savage. You may argue, of course, as Dr. Inge does, that it isn't quite playing the game to judge the normal person by the reactions of lunatics. This argument isn't as reasonable as it sounds. A so-called normal mind is in many ways more complicated and difficult to understand than an abnormal one. It is good scientific practice therefore to proceed from the simpler to the more complex. As a matter of fact the most remarkable advances in psychological science have come through investigation of the abnormal.

In any case the same objection cannot be made against our second source of information. Study of the minds of normal children during the first two years of life has confirmed those earlier conjectures. There is now good evidence to show that during those early years *every* human being passes through the same phases of animistic fear as are only too apparent in the insane and in the primitive savage. The child, too, peoples the external world with evil influences from which it shrinks in fear and which, given the opportunity, it attacks in rage. Like the savage sorcerer, the child has an unshakable belief in the dangerous powers of its own bodily substances, and in certain states of mind shrinks from personal contact with the bodies of parents, nurses, and other children. Moreover it has the same fears of the dark as the savage. Like the savage it interprets new and sudden noises in terms of external malevolence. Noises during the night may cause it to huddle in a corner of its cot or to cry out in terror, observations which have their exact parallel in the behaviour of most primitive tribes.

But it is not enough to collect curious information of this sort. We must be able to explain why the minds of children, insane persons, and savages are so preoccupied with irrational fears. Merely to call the lunatic deluded explains nothing. When he tells us that his life is threatened, we must draw the inevitable conclusion that somewhere in the recesses

of his own mind there exists an active impulse to kill. When a child looks askance at a smudge on his nurse's cheek or shrinks in fear from a dark cupboard under the staircase, we are entitled to infer that the source of his fear lies in his own repressed emotions. When the savage refuses to touch food on which the shadow of an unfriendly person had fallen, it is clear that his own hate, not the shadow, is the motive of his conduct. Even the most peaceable of citizens who has the misfortune to go to bed in a rage can observe how in the dreams of the same night he appears to be pursued by some savage animal or other. This last observation provides us with the most satisfactory clue to the mystery. By dramatizing two opposing tendencies, playing the innocent rôle himself and putting the blame for the savage impulse on the wild animal the dreamer is able to disclaim responsibility. He denies his impulses. He defends his mind at the cost of anxiety. The conclusion is obvious: the animistic fears we encounter in all human beings represent the first struggles of man with his own primitive instincts.

Prehistoric Remains in Our Own Minds

Please don't misunderstand me. I am not trying to suggest that the dangers of being human are due solely to the existence in man of primitive instincts. That is a simpler form of dangerousness which man

shares with other animals. And in so far as it is measurable, a safer form. The lunatic is dangerous not because he has secret impulses to kill. We all have secret impulses to kill, and given social sanction most of us are ready to kill, as the history of war shows only too clearly. Paradoxical as it may seem the lunatic is dangerous because of his struggle to control his killing impulses. During this struggle he comes to believe that others are about to kill him, and under the influence of this idea he may run amok and kill his wife and children. This 'coming to believe' is the end of a complicated mental process which is neither rational nor conscious. The process has a technical label. It is called the unconscious mechanism of projection. It is a form of unconscious denial. The mind, or, to speak a little more carefully, an unconscious part of the ego, attributes to an external object an impulse which, if it remained within the confines of the ego, would cause mental pain or conflict. So it projects the impulse. To give a well-worn example: when a little child who has been scolded earlier in the day confides to a casual visitor that 'pussy simply hates nurse' we realize that the child's own hate has been baulked either by helplessness or genuine affection or both. To avoid the pains of frustration or conflict the child's ego utters what we as observers know to be a gross libel on 'pussy's' character. We must note, however, that the effort to deny the

impulse is at the same time an effort to control it. Because of course the impulse still exists within the mind of the child. We see then that what appears to us merely a dangerous peculiarity, namely an unexplained impulse to attack others, is really an attempt to master instinct. It is, in fact, a step towards civilization. Here lies the secret of man's irrationality. All those peculiarities we encounter in ourselves and others represent the out-croppings of a civilization more ancient than the most pre-historic of human remains.

But there is a vast difference between the pre-historic remains we gaze at in the British Museum and the prehistoric remains we detect in our own minds. Although we are mostly unaware of the fact, this ancient civilization still functions in every one of us. What is more, we have every reason to be thankful that it does. When man first projected into the external world those hobgoblins which were nothing other than the ferocities of his own instincts, he had taken the first and most difficult step in his evolution from being an animal governed solely by reflexes. Every child repeats that evolution, and every adult continues to use the tricks he learned in the cradle. Indeed without these earlier mental mechanisms man would remain at the level of the higher apes. Without projection there would be no science, no art, no literature, no philosophy, and, despite the somewhat shocked protest of Dr. Inge,

no religion. The sorcerer who first boiled a sharp bone in a magical cauldron and pointed it at the enemy he wished to kill was a pioneer of science. His gropings in a world of black magic paved the way to the discovery of the electric drill, the surgeon's scalpel and the sculptor's chisel.

The Dilemma of Mankind

Here, then, lies the dilemma of mankind. Behind the crust of modern civilization—for it is no more than a crust—there lies concealed a more ancient mental structure. Although we are unconscious of its existence, this influences man's conduct as vitally now as it did in the dimmest of past ages. Without it man would slip back into the bestial state from which he so painfully emerged. For there is little or no evidence that man's deepest instincts, in particular his impulses to hate, have altered very much in the course of evolution. Study of dream life in adults and children makes this point certain beyond cavil. On the other hand, although this older civilization has still enormous survival value, it is a constant source of danger. Like all primitive survivals it tends to excessive and sometimes uncontrollable activity. Any emotional stress, a sudden panic, a threat of calamity, a failure in business or in marriage, a severe illness, the death of a loved one, and it is liable to stampede man into conduct

prejudicial to himself and to his neighbours. It may even bring about his own destruction. These may be unpalatable truths, but they are truths which civilized man must face if he is to take a hand in controlling his own destiny.

II

THE QUEST OF SOCIAL SANITY

I HAVE tried to suggest that despite his civilized exterior man remains in heart and head a savage. By that I wish to convey not simply that he is subject to primitive impulses. Alarming as that statement may appear it is only a psychological commonplace. Man always has been, and to the end of his course will remain, endowed with instincts of inconceivable ferocity. His resemblance to a savage lies in the fact that his methods of controlling instinct do not differ very much from those employed by the primitive tribesman. This point of view is admittedly hard to grasp. Possibly a homelier illustration will serve to make the situation clear. Suppose that instead of calling for the day-nurse, we allowed an infant of eighteen months to look after a one-year-old baby in a tantrum. It would not be at all surprising if the rising two-year-old himself went into a tantrum, or smacked the baby, or burst into tears. Drawing a parallel with civilized man, we may say that although from the point of view of rational function man appears to have donned the nurse's uniform, yet his irrationalities clearly show that this is largely a matter of fancy dress. Stripped of his uniform he is still a bewildered two-year-old, striving to

control the roaring passions of his one-year-old self: in other words struggling to the best of his immature capacities with problems of instinct-mastery that are almost too much for him. The conflicts of civilized man and the conflicts of the savage do not differ in any essential respect.

Folk Lore for the Foreign Office?

If we give provisional assent to this proposition, the next step in our investigation is clear. We must examine the foundations of Society to see how far these are influenced by the irrationalities of the individual. This is by no means an easy task. It is a curious fact that a trained anthropologist can tell us more about the organization of a savage tribe than any sociologist can tell us of the group function of the inhabitants of Great Britain. And, talking of the dangers of being human, it is a still more curious fact that the people in most desperate need of accurate information are, as a general rule, the least informed in the matter. During recent years we have been afforded the spectacle of the statesmen of Europe meeting periodically in solemn conclave to deal with one group crisis after another. Yet it is safe to say that the vast majority of these delegates have not the remotest idea of the fundamental laws governing group relations. Every now and then a Foreign Secretary will talk glibly of aggressiveness in nations being a sign of fear, but having made

this momentous pronouncement he feels he has done his duty by psychology. So far from taking any steps to eliminate fear in an aggressor nation, he will in all probability adopt those diplomatic measures most calculated to arouse it. No doubt our diplomats would protest that after all they are men of affairs. And no doubt they are, in the sense that they attempt to solve most of their difficulties by two devices, both of hoary antiquity. Either they are guided by precedent or adopt the method of trial and error. Yet precedent is essentially the wisdom of the insect and has the same limitations: whilst trial and error is one of the most reckless human expedients, justified only by success. When errors are made in international affairs the price is paid by the group as a whole. And in these days it is no exaggeration to say that that price is decimation and disaster. The moral to be drawn is of course that no one should be allowed within five miles of any Foreign Office who cannot pass a matriculation examination on the folk-lore of the savage. Only when we understand the primitive laws governing the relations of individuals and groups may we hope for sane or successful diplomacy.

The Nature of Unconscious Impulses

To return to our immediate task, let us consider just how rational the average European group is. Owing to the size and complexity of national units,

it is essential to narrow down the investigation. We must apply the same tests as are applied by the anthropologist to the savage tribe. Now if you read any modern textbook on savage organization you will find that the author devotes most of his space to the following subjects. He describes the peculiar laws and taboos by which the sexual and family life of the tribe is governed, he enumerates the systems of black and white magic which are intended to regulate respectively the killing or curing of individuals, he discusses the various superstitious rituals which enter into the economic organization of the tribe, e.g. the raising and distribution of crops. And, of course, he gives an account of myths, supernatural beliefs, orgies, saturnalia, war customs, and the like. In short he tells us just how the savage deals with his love-impulses, his destructive impulses, and his impulses of self-preservation. In passing, it is to be remarked how widely his method differs from that of the sociologist, who is usually obsessed by political economy to the exclusion of all else.

If now we consider the regulation of sex impulse and family life under Western civilization, an important distinction can be drawn between savage and civilized groups. Despite the fact that the Prayer Book sternly forbids us to marry our grandmothers, incest has almost ceased to be a conscious temptation for civilized man. Society no longer preoccupies itself with deliberate and systematic measures to

prevent its occurrence,* such, for example, as the stringent taboos and condign punishments of savages. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence to show that in the case of civilized man these external taboos have simply been replaced by inner prohibitions. Investigation of the impulse life of children proves that the same primitive forms of family love, rivalry and hate exist from birth. They are, however, almost completely mastered by the age of five. This mastery is not easily achieved. The neurotic illnesses which are rampant in all European countries bear witness to the fact that this internal control of incestuous impulse together with the hatred it engenders can often be maintained only at the cost of illness in later life. Sexual inhibition of one sort or another is the commonest malady of mankind. And it will scarcely be disputed that a large number of our sex-conventions both private and public are irrational in the highest degree. One might instance

* To prevent misunderstanding it is well to stress the point that the savage group differs from the civilized not so much in the matter of punishment for incest as in the elaborate *preventive* measures employed. Actual incest does occur in both civilized and primitive groups. When detected it is punished in both groups. But civilized man does not employ the same precautions against incest although, of course, many vestiges of older precautions still exist. The prohibitions of the Prayer Book are a case in point. For most people they have an antiquated flavour. They tend to evoke slightly amused curiosity indicating thereby that the danger of infringement is generally felt to be minimal.

in this connection the manifest absurdities and inconsistencies exhibited in the censorship of plays and books. Only recently a clergyman was reported as saying that he would sooner hand his daughter poison than give her such and such a book.

Dr. Inge remarked in his introductory address that he was unable to see any evidence for what he regarded as a Freudian obsession, namely, a belief in the manifoldness of sexual impulse. And no doubt many of his hearers agreed with him. But really one might as well dispute the existence of telephone messages because one cannot see electric currents or touch underground telephone cables. Civilized man has to some extent succeeded in driving one of the most important of his instincts underground. Yet a moment's reflection will show that the whole solidarity of the civilized group depends on the inner regulation of these sex instincts. Without this regulation men would never succeed in banding themselves into groups at all. The repression of sexuality within the family group and the substitution of comparatively friendly bonds between rival males was a momentous step in the social organization of man. No doubt it had enormous survival value. And no doubt it continues to weld groups together. If this unconscious control were relaxed a few Boy Scout organizations might survive, and the club life of octogenarians would

doubtless continue, but the social life of adult man would revert to a jungle organization.

The Integration of Groups

This automatic regulation of sex life by which the primal jealousies of the male can be tamed and to some extent substituted by friendly relations is a discovery which is vital to the understanding of many obscure social phenomena. Pacifists, for example, will embark on the most naïve explanation of war phenomena without paying a moment's attention to the fact that wars are conducted by men against men, or that on the outbreak of war men are ready to embrace each other in the street prior to setting forth to kill the strange men of the enemy country. I do not suggest, of course, that all social solidarity depends on this one stream of impulse. The contribution of infantile love-ties to group solidarity is much more comprehensive. It can be detected in such manifestations as occurred, for example, during the recent Jubilee celebrations. Here we had an interesting illustration of two group phenomena: the uprising of friendliness between strangers of both sexes when the central figure representing the Father of his people was by common consent respected and loved, and at the same time the exploitation of public celebrations to loosen the irksome bonds of social inhibition. A Russian *émigré* remarked to me that,

standing at Piccadilly at the height of the revels, he suddenly began to quake with terror. His explanation was intuitive but wise. The same slackening of inhibition might, given an occasion of war or revolution, have loosened berserk furies in Regent Street instead of good-natured exuberance.

Magic and Ritual

I see that I have strayed a little from my original intention of drawing a parallel between European and savage society. I have tried to show in passing that group relations are actually charged with secret forces and governed by secret laws. There are of course several other unconscious mechanisms which regulate group-life but for the moment I must be content with the examples given. To return now to our study of racial parallels, we must consider what manifestations of black and white magic exist in European tribes. Strictly speaking it would be justifiable to include here the superstitions about life and death which abound in Europe; for example the objection to wearing green dresses, sneezing, spilling salt, or lighting three cigarettes with one match. A collection of simple superstitions current in civilized countries would fill several stout volumes. Each superstition can be classified in terms of white and black magic. Whenever an idea is followed by some thought, gesture or action intended to counteract its baleful influence, such counter measures are

accurately described as white magic. The workings of black magic are even simpler to detect. When in the midst of an apparently friendly argument your dinner companion has occasion to break a bread pellet in two you have already sufficient reason to know that a magical attempt has been made on your life. But apart from these spontaneous manifestations of magic, a large number of European magical superstitions have been more or less effectively disguised. A great deal of interest in magical killing and curing has been officially transferred to the provinces of medical science, of faith healing, and of the Church. Doctors are inclined to repudiate this suggestion with warmth. But they protest in vain. Very little study of abandoned 'fashions' in medical or surgical treatment leads us to the conclusion that, despite the scientific explanations offered during the height of the vogue, the efficacy of the remedy when it did exist depended on the influences of suggestion and superstition.

As for the influence of superstitious ritual and belief in the economic organization of the European Group, I need hardly remind you that in the view of most economists man arranges his everyday business affairs in the most stupid fashion. This is true not only of economic organization in general but of the most trivial details of business routine. Actually a psychological research institute exists which investigates the efficiency of various indus-

trial techniques. It will tell you, for example, just how much time is lost by factory workers in making various twiddly movements prior to carrying out any effective action. But the true significance of these alleged time-wasting procedures can be assessed only if we remember that some neurotic individuals spend all their time and energy making them, and are consequently unable to work at all. Like all other superstitious devices they are essentially ritualistic movements designed to invoke protection and ward off bad luck. It is only fair to add that the red-tape of the office-worker belongs to the same category. Economic irrationality on a grander scale is exemplified by the reaction of many Governments to the problem of unemployment. It is regarded as a virtue to endeavour to reduce unemployment: yet it is equally virtuous to organize industry in such a way that the nation's leisure time is increased. Instead of regarding unemployment as badly distributed leisure, and proceeding to rectify the distribution, many nations embark on various social plans intended at the same time to reduce leisure and to increase it. If further evidence of wholesale economic stupidity is required one need only recall the fact that peoples still embark on wars in spite of the warnings shouted at them by economists that it doesn't pay to make war.

Myth Formation

To turn from these main lines of comparison to the study of less dramatic manifestations: let us consider for a moment the question of myth formation, a group propensity we are only too ready to regard as exclusively savage or barbarian. Now I have actually shaken hands with a man who assured me that he shook hands with a Russian, one of a trainload of Russians, which was part of a Russian Army passing through Great Britain on the way to France in 1914. Even more typical though not so widespread was the myth that Kitchener was not drowned in the *Hampshire* but that he survived either as a prisoner or a secret agent directing the British forces under cover. A similar myth arose after the death of Sir Hector MacDonald, one of the heroes of the South African War. And most of you will recall the myth of the 'Angels of Mons.' The development of these myths merely goes to show that in the civilized group, as with the simplest savage, the wish is father to the thought. We of course wanted a Russian Army to come to our aid. Indeed, but for the existence of primitive wishes and the natural urge to gratify them a strange silence would fall over the printing presses of England. Of course, it would be manifestly unfair to the newspaper to suggest that its sole function is deliberate myth formation. The

newspaper after all merely holds up the mirror to everyman. That is why certain superior people are so quick to talk of the 'Yellow' Press. They hate to see what their own inhibited interests are like. Studying the ordinary news columns, it is obvious how much group interest is devoted to sexual wishes and phantasies. Not simply to love and its disruption, as in the case of newspaper gossip about the love affairs of the great, but to every possible derivative of sex-interest from sun bathing to the love of one's country. Similarly the interest in murder, crime, accident and sudden death, in war and rumours of war, requires no elaborate interpretation. It permits a vicarious enjoyment of unconscious phantasies of hate, revenge and destruction. The fact is, however, that the most important daily news about mankind is contained not in the news columns but in the advertisement pages. With almost monotonous regularity, and often in glaring headlines, our advertisers remind us that our main enemy is fear. Fear of death, of mutilation, of deformity, of disease, of bodily and mental blemishes, of superfluous hairs or loss of memory, of poisons in the system or in food, of odours either in the body or in the household sanitation. They promise us long life, health and beauty, a vigorous career, a school-girl complexion, vitalizing foods, sweet perfumes and beautiful bathrooms. And it is equally patent that as regards gullibility and suggestibility, the civilized

He said: "Sorry I can't play **"WHAT'S THE USE...?"**
again — I haven't the time."

But he thought: **Do** *she thought,*
"If only she'd get rid of 'B.O.'
she'd soon find I wasn't in such a **CONSTANT COLI**
hurry."

He wasn't make you a
even lost- MENACE *NO WOMAN'S AT HER BEST with a shiny NOSE or FACE*
Kills Health a *You,*

how were they to know? *me*



Must
CONTINUAL
CATARRH
make life
a MISERY?

*and its well
asset. How
fully appreciated by those who
are irrevocably becoming blind. Because
the eyes are so efficient, adapting*



"Everybody
expected I would be
an Old Maid"

THE TIREDNESS THAT KEEPS
WOMEN LONELY



"CHEER UP! LIFE'S NOT SO BAD"

"With almost monotonous regularity our advertisers remind us that our main enemy is fear."

(With acknowledgements to the Listener)

group is no different from the savage. Newspaper rumours fly, slogans rally, causes are capriciously abandoned. But please do not think that all these reactions could be produced if the hordes of newspaper readers had not already in their own secret minds the impulses which the newspaper merely welds together.

The Young Hero

To many of you it will no doubt appear a far cry from myth formation to constitutional monarchy. Yet it is possible to trace the earliest forms of savage family organization through different systems of savage kingship down to the most varied assortment of present-day institutions. And at every stage in this development we discover myth formations which do not alter much in content from generation to generation. Behind these political systems and myth formations there exists as lively as in prehistoric times, the eternal conflict between father and son. It is true that a constitutional monarch is to some extent immune from atavistic family hatred so long as his ministers can be reduced periodically to the political dust—one of the few good arguments, by the way, for party government. But he is not completely immune. When the drawing-rooms of Bayswater surrender themselves to a delighted tittle-tattle about young princesses or retail with some particularity the number of successors to the throne,

no one would dream of suggesting that Bayswater is a disaffected and seditious area. Yet such is in psychological fact the case. It is of course a form of disaffection which is held in suspense by outspoken protestations of loyalty to the throne. And in any case the revolutionary appetites of society are quick to find less treasonable satisfactions. True, the music-hall star who is past his prime is not ceremonially slaughtered as some kings once were, but he is remorselessly deposed from his throne and allowed to starve in a garret. When a sports champion is superseded a sense of positive triumph permits itself to be felt amongst the followers of the particular sport. And all the while the myth of the young hero has lost none of its vigour. It is as active to-day as in those primitive times when story and song glorified the power and wisdom of the younger generation. Indeed, it is possibly more active to-day than ever. No doubt modern emphasis on the virtues of elderly statesmen, together with the lowered death rate amongst our sixty-year-olds, delays satisfaction of the primitive urge to adore the young hero at the expense of the older generation. But the urge is not abated thereby, it is merely displaced. The facile worship by modern groups of speed kings, beauty queens, matinée idols, cinema stars and sports champions not only alleviates a deep sense of shortcoming in the young and middle-aged, but satisfies the perpetual urge of the young to overcome

the old. Very harmless substitutes, you may say. Much more humane than the savage custom of inviting the old men of the tribe to shin up a tall palm, which is then shaken with scarcely concealed satisfaction. Yet given a turn of the political wheel, our young enthusiasts may harness themselves to the chariot of a dictator and, having so merged their volition in his, give a terrifying impetus to his slightest whim. All the dictator need promise to secure this allegiance is the uprooting of an old order. May I add that there are two political luxuries which civilized countries can ill afford. One is the elder statesman whose imagination is as rigid as his arteries: the other is the young hero inflated with gaseous ideals, dashing forth to win his spurs in a world of hard facts.*

Suburban Orgies!

The process of displacement I have described can

* I don't suggest of course that the myth of the young hero is created by those who actually play the part. It is created by the combined forces of dissatisfied Youth and doting Motherhood. When during the earlier stages of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis the picture of Mr. Anthony Eden was projected on to the cinema news-screen, one frequently heard such remarks as the following: "Isn't he *sweet*: how *horrid* of the Italians not to do what he wants." Dissatisfied women are as much responsible for the myth as the children they idealize. Incidentally one can gather from experiences of this sort just how far political ideals and the prestige of political leaders depend on an unconscious displacement of quite unmodified family feeling.

be observed also in the case of savage saturnalia. True that the Wimbledon centre court is not spattered with blood and sawdust during the spectacle, that the revolver shots of the gangster film are canned in the sound box, that seated in a comfortable stall we can permit our marrows to be frozen by a Grand Guignol playlet. But although it would appear that the primitive impulses of the group are more inhibited, the appearance is deceiving. We live in an age when at any time twelve million citizens may be condemned to die in the saturnalia of organized warfare. In times of peace such a train of thought seems ridiculously biassed, although, of course, we do execute some criminals in times of peace, and the whole group participates in this ritual, prospectively during that gladiatorial combat, the murder trial, and actually on the morning of the execution. But penal methods apart, there is ample evidence in everyday group life of the powerful and dangerous impulses which run below the surface. Only recently we have seen Mr. Hore Belisha come forth courageously as a modern David to fight the concealed homicidal and suicidal impulses of the British motorist and pedestrian. Indeed, it is an interesting fact that with every advance in applied science man's unconscious seizes on the opportunity to overthrow some of his inhibitions. The road-hog is not simply a hog, he is a maniac carried away by his temporary mastery of a machine. And

naturally the victims of his slaying expeditions prove to be accident-prone, which is only another way of saying that they are suicidal. Incidentally I do not believe that the road-hog is necessarily the most dangerous animal. A much more dangerous man at the wheel is the inhibited neurotic in a state of unconsumed irritation.*

In short, the more deeply we investigate the problem, the more irresistible becomes the conclusion that group life is governed by mechanisms which are identical with those observed in the individual. But whereas the irrationalities of the individual are usually limited as to consequences, the effects of group irrationality are infinitely more incalculable and therefore infinitely more dangerous. Concealed irrationalities are the most dangerous of all. When in mediaeval times a persecutory fear in the group gave rise to witch-hunting it was reasonably certain that the wave of anxiety would spend itself in the form of witch-hunting. Since this form of discharging fear has gone out of fashion there is not the same certainty of limiting the discharge. A wave of persecutory fear may cause one

* Since this was written some semi-official observations have been published on motoring fatalities, suggesting in effect that whatever precautions are taken one cannot prevent people killing themselves by this particular method. This view does not take sufficient cognisance of the mediaeval conditions of road-making in this country, but it is nevertheless substantially accurate.

political party to hurl abuse at its opponents or occasionally to imprison an extremist, as is the case in England. It may give rise to racial persecution, as of the Jews in Germany. It may end in periodic massacres of social groups, as when Russian Communists attempt literally to exterminate their opponents. More calamitous still, the wave of persecutory fear may not be able to find adequate discharge within the group. It may band a nation together in a state of mind when, given any sort of cause, good, bad, or indifferent, it will find or manufacture an excuse for war and set forth on a crusade outside its own boundaries. This observation does not apply solely to so-called aggressor nations. It applies to all nations. And it applies with particular force to those nations who in their anxiety to end war are prepared to wage it.

The Dangers of Being Smug

On the whole, then, there is something to be said for the view that there are dangers in being human. But I should like to emphasize again what is the greatest of all dangers. It is this. So long as we remain in ignorance of the instinctual forces that strive to be our masters, so long as we idealize the counter-forces of reason and intelligence, and by so doing conceal from ourselves the fact that the true opposing forces are as irrational as our instincts, we are liable to develop a state of smug and some-

times self-righteous satisfaction with our civilization. And this is of little use to us when the cracks in that civilization begin to widen. On the other hand, it is equally futile to rail against these forces or to deny their existence, or pretend that they exist only in the group impulses of other nations. Such views are not only short-sighted, but ignore the fundamental fact that without these very impulses man would assuredly perish. I have suggested that the primitive sexual impulses of man are responsible for a large part of his hatreds, rivalries and orgies of destruction, yet if by some means these primitive drives were held in abeyance the human race would suddenly fall into a deep trance, disturbed by feeble and fitful efforts at food getting. It is doubtful even if man's destructive impulses would raise their heads, for the race would be automatically assured of complete extinction.

The conclusion is obvious. If we have serious aspirations towards sanity in the external and internal relations of groups it is essential to measure dispassionately the energies we have to contend with and the group laws that regulate them. In the last twenty years the most fundamental of these laws have been discovered. But these discoveries have never been applied. Sufficient is known of group bonds to inspire sociological research for the next few centuries. Yet I question if one in a hundred thousand individuals, certainly not one in a hundred

statesmen, has even heard of the epoch-making monograph in which they were first described by Freud.* In any case, I question whether man will ever take kindly to the view that he regulates his group affairs by laws which were originally fashioned in the jungle and are reaffirmed by each generation in the nursery.

* *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, by Sigmund Freud. Hogarth Press.

III

CIVILIZATION'S CHOICE OF SCAPEGOATS: CRIME OR ILL HEALTH

It will scarcely be disputed that the field of psychological science is hedged in by moral prejudices. Many of the simplest conclusions as to the nature of man arouse considerable resentment. In some instances the mere attempt to investigate his nature is regarded as rather reprehensible. These prejudices are as old as civilization, if not indeed an inevitable accompaniment of civilization. After all the lower animals may tackle their scientific problems in a manner which is conservative to the point of stupidity, they may be prejudiced by fear and take unnecessarily to flight, but otherwise they are honest, unbiassed and free from a trace of hypocrisy. It is only right to add that man has never had a fair chance. Not only is he biassed by an unconscious tendency to view life animistically, that is to say as either wholly good or wholly evil, but almost from the moment he draws breath, his parents take good care to discourage anything approaching a scientific attitude of mind. Children mustn't do this, mustn't say that, mustn't ask the other. What the parents think, say, or do is right. What the child thinks, says, or does is nine times out of ten bad,

or nasty. Naturally most children respond to this grotesque assumption either by humouring their parents or by developing a genuine moral duplicity in judgment. Small wonder then that the adult finds it difficult to be unbiassed when faced with problems of moral conduct.

Crime and Disease

Test the matter for yourselves. Suppose that your next door neighbour broke his leg or that he became a chronic invalid : in all probability the news would arouse in you feelings of sympathy, together with a genuine desire to help. But suppose it came to your ears that your next door neighbour had just committed burglary or forgery or that he was a ticket-of-leave man. You would most likely be horrified, disapprove strongly, and consider informing his landlord, if not the police. Now you will readily agree that such a frame of mind would not be conducive to a scientific examination of the causes of your neighbour's crime. The fact is that society in its hurry to judge crime has neither the time nor the inclination to investigate it. Despite all the majesty and circumstance of the law, there is a certain furtiveness about criminal social procedure which is highly significant. Ready-made labels are attached to each situation, and as soon as certain matters of fact have been established by the usual legal processes, the convicted criminal is hurried

into a prison where he literally disappears from sight. Even if he escapes prison through probation he becomes automatically a contaminated citizen subject to all manner of moral and economic interference.

On the other hand, imagine how indignant you would be if the family doctor instead of investigating a pain in your chest, abused you violently and threatened to call in the police. You may recall Samuel Butler's story of an imaginary country called Erewhon in which criminals were treated as invalids by professional 'straighteners' and where invalids were dealt with as criminals. His description of the consumptive being brought from jail, severely reprimanded by the magistrate and sent back to jail to die, must have struck many readers as a rather grim absurdity. Yet many more absurd things have happened in the history of medicine. After all it is not so very long ago since lunatics were flogged. This old-fashioned system of treating illness by punishing the invalid is, of course, part of the stock-in-trade of the witch-doctor, who justifies it, however, on the ground that he must drive out the evil spirits with which his patient is possessed. You see, then, that the investigation of crime is not a simple matter. The most robust common-sense views, e.g. that we punish criminals because they have done wrong or in order to deter them from a repetition of the offence, cannot pass unquestioned. We must

consider whether the punishment of criminals is not based, to some extent, on the theory and practice of magic.

It is only fair to add that society is more enlightened in its attitude to crime than it gives itself credit for. An early hospital experience impressed this fact vividly on my mind. I remember being called up to deal with a patient who during the night had developed a sudden delirium. During this attack he sprang up, grabbed the hot-water bottle from the patient in the next bed and dived back under his own. When, by the united efforts of several nurses, he was once more tucked up, he repeated the attack with increasing violence until a sedative was administered. It will not surprise you to learn that this glaring case of robbery with violence was not reported to the police nor, for that matter, did the patient subsequently take proceedings against the hospital for wrongful detention. The procedure was governed by two vital principles: that crime may be a manifestation of disease and that, when it is, the first and legitimate step is to alleviate the disease. And, in fact, society not only refuses to punish the anti-social behaviour of insane persons, but officially condones the criminal acts of a large percentage of the population. The thefts and violent assaults of sucklings are universally winked at by the authorities, and in any enlightened household the by no means uncommon attempts of three and

four-year-old children to murder their baby brothers or sisters are met with a considerable degree of forbearance and understanding. In short from the point of view of criminal responsibility society has not hesitated to set up a privileged class numbering roughly one-tenth of the total population.

Emotional Factors in Crime

All this, you will no doubt say, is common sense, even commonplace. If so, I hope your courage will not falter at the next step. Shortly after the birth of a baby brother, a little four-year-old girl began to steal cucumbers from fruit shops. Reproved for the offence, she stopped stealing. Five years later she was expelled from school for stealing from lockers. Yet apart from a few coppers, which she never spent, her main concern was to steal pencils, particularly those with a coloured butt. Some of you may find it difficult to conceive that there could be any possible relation between the acts of thieving and the birth of the baby brother. Yet such proved to be the case. It did not take long to elicit the fact that she was very seriously upset by this event. Immediately afterwards her relations with her parents changed for the worse. She suffered from acute jealousy of the rival baby, not simply because it was a baby but because it was a baby-boy. She felt, rightly or wrongly, that her parents preferred him because he was a boy. And on one occasion

she made a determined attempt to murder him in his cradle, using a hammer for the purpose. Not that she was a passionately refractory or asocial child. On the contrary up to this time she had been good to a fault. Her compulsive thefts were really symbolic actions. They combined the unconscious impulse to revenge herself on her parents with the equally forlorn unconscious hope that she could somehow or other turn herself into a boy. So she stole first cucumbers and later pencils, no doubt combining the idea of developing masculine sex characters in this way with the impulse to deprive her rival of his apparent superiority. In this particular respect her procedure was no different from the magical rituals of primitive tribesmen who when castrating the body of an enemy hope by preserving the trophy to acquire the sexual strength of the enemy.

If you shake your heads at this interpretation, I have little hope that you will be convinced by my next. The case was that of an able-bodied man, an habitual thief, frequently sentenced for stealing. The relevant facts were that he was illegitimate and had only once seen a photograph of his mother and that he stole not only money but worn clothing and photograph frames. The money he invariably secreted in a drain pipe, the old clothes were stuffed into dustbins, the photograph frames were treasured in a bedroom drawer. I shall not

trouble you with all the details of the case, which was an exceedingly complicated one. If you are interested in the emotional factors determining behaviour you will have guessed already that the main cause of his antisocial compulsions was the emotional impoverishment of his early life. The fact that he had lived in very straitened circumstances no doubt aggravated this sense of impoverishment but the real dynamic factor was a set of unconscious phantasies. He constantly dreamed of a mother who had either deserted him or been forcibly taken from him and imprisoned in a rich house where she lived in luxury. His stealing compulsion was a combination of a revenge impulse, revenging himself for neglect, together with a desire to rescue the imprisoned Princess. So he broke into suburban villas—his reality ideal of luxury—and stole photograph frames. Needless to say he was himself unaware of these motives and was quite ready to accept the social label of thief. Socially regarded he was of course a thief.

I am aware that these thumb-nail sketches are liable to be misleading. Dragged out of their context such motivations are likely to sound absurd. Yet it is manifestly impossible to reproduce here the complete chain of evidence. Fortunately there is a simple method by which the reliability of the findings can be tested. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. By uncovering these unconscious phantasies and releasing the unconscious emotions

which are bound up with them it is possible to cure the compulsive thief. In spite of the fact that grown-up criminals are more difficult to treat than juvenile offenders we have even more convincing proof that the actions of some habitual thieves are due to unconscious conflict than in the case of young children who do not appear in Court. Within the last few years an Institute for the Treatment of Delinquency has been established in London, where such cases are investigated. Other causes having been eliminated, the cases of psychological crime are sifted out, given treatment, and, what is more, in many instances permanently cured by psychological means alone.

The Assessment of Social Factors

At this point you will no doubt begin to suspect that psycho-analysts are merely woolly-minded humanitarians neglectful of the ordinary social factors in crime. Or you may feel that by emphasizing the psychological factors in crime I seek to deny the existence of 'natural' crime. These objections are not quite so reasonable as they appear. To some extent they are influenced by what might fairly be called political bias. I have often observed that Socialists are amongst the first to question the importance of psychological factors in crime. True they are in favour of more rational and humane treatment of criminals largely because they have

natural sympathies for the rebel, the under-dog and those in conflict with authority. Holding strong views on the importance of economic factors in human conduct, they naturally feel that the most likely cause of stealing is social necessity. If it is not social necessity it is at any rate a natural tendency to make a living without any particular effort. On the other hand the most respectable Conservatives are quite convinced that criminals are lazy people who would rather steal than work, and whose anti-social tendencies are mere perversities directed against the laws of property. Naturally they incline strongly to the view that punishment is the only cure. Now if we are going to favour rational explanations of this sort it is only fair to carry the rational process a little farther. If crime is only a mode of making a living, it seems strange that a profession should be chosen whose material benefits are so far below the average return of ill-paid workers. As for the absence of effort, this argument will scarcely bear examination. It is clear that many forms of criminal behaviour involve an expenditure of skill and energy which far exceed that involved in the more humdrum social occupations.

In any case the accusation that psychologists neglect social causes of crime is unfounded. On the contrary, they are the first to take these factors into account. They do maintain, however, that in psychological cases of criminal behaviour the social factors

are merely aggravating circumstances. Curious as it may seem, poverty precipitates anti-social conduct in such cases, not for common-sense reasons, but because the general frustration of wishes and lack of proper food reanimate childish fears, e.g. the fear of emotional starvation. Society has much overestimated the importance of social factors in crime. Certainly there is an increase in the number of offences during an economic depression. But the striking fact remains that the level of social honesty remains remarkably high during the most trying economic and social conditions.

Stated as cautiously as possible, the more sensational discoveries regarding crime are these: it has been proved that adult crime in civilized communities is due, much more frequently than is supposed, to the unconscious persistence of the fears and emotional conflicts of childhood: secondly, the fears discovered on analysis of the average compulsive criminal prove to be mainly of the animistic type, that is to say, they are irrational fears of injury or persecution. Most important of all, it has been proved that many types of criminal conduct can be cured by relieving these unconscious fears. Accurate statistics are not yet available, but you may take it that other causes having been eliminated, the number of criminals *curable* by psychological treatment is, roughly, equal to the number of neurotic persons curable by the same means.

Moral Outlook of the Criminal

These are essentially practical conclusions to which effect must sooner or later be given in the laws of the land. In the meantime, we must confine ourselves to those discoveries which throw a fresh light on the organization of society. The unconscious motives I have described so far have been in the nature either of revenges for earlier emotional neglect or of attempts to dramatize in everyday life some forgotten wish or phantasy dating from early childhood. There are, however, still deeper motivations of criminal conduct. Closer study proves what has long been suspected, namely, that accepted views of social morality require the most radical revision. For example, it is generally held that criminals are devoid of all moral feeling. Investigation shows, on the contrary, that as well as having many quite ordinary ethical conventions and social codes, criminals suffer at times from a burdensome moral sense. It is, however, a primitive moral sense. So primitive indeed that the criminal himself may be quite unaware of or even deny its existence. This difference in moral outlook is aptly illustrated by a conversation recorded between a cannibal and a European friend. The cannibal stoutly maintained that he at least cooked his meat, whereas Europeans were occasionally addicted to eating raw meat, a practice which, in the cannibal's view, was only

appropriate for animals. In other words, the habit of eating raw meat offended the cannibal's moral sense. The European Administrator would of course regard cannibalism as an atrocious form of crime. Again, the savage, according to whose ethical code certain forms of stealing and adultery are praiseworthy, has nevertheless established customs regulating property and marriage, which are much more restrictive than those of the European. Now I do not mean to suggest that the European criminal is a savage. On the contrary, unless he shows some obvious signs of mental deficiency or incipient insanity the average criminal cannot be distinguished from his fellows. I do suggest, however, that in certain matters of moral judgment his mind has retained a primitive stamp. He suffers from excessive fears and deals with them by developing an exaggerated form of conscience. The moral code he follows as if his life depended on it is more ancient than that of his more respectable fellow-citizens, but it is nevertheless a moral code. Judged by ordinary standards, he appears to be an unusually aggressive or destructive person. The vast majority of indictable and non-indictable offences take the form of attack against the property or persons of others. Yet the criminal, without knowing it, has even more concern about his destructive tendencies than his law-abiding brother, and, having more anxiety, he tends to behave in a primitive

way. He projects his destructive impulses on to the external world, to which he then behaves anti-socially. But like the civilized neurotic, he does not know why. Indeed in his perplexity he often agrees with the censorious judgment passed on him by society. He may even beg a magistrate to punish him. Occasionally, however, he may offer an apparently inadequate reason. An enthusiastic collector of antiques once told me that whenever a dealer's face looked unkind, he made a point of stealing some small object from the shop. This apparently frivolous excuse was nearer to the psychological truth than he knew. Of course, being a wealthy man and a good buyer he could afford to indulge in this ritual revenge; had he been poor he would simply have been charged with plain stealing, and under existing laws no psychologist could have saved him from prison.

Whipping-boy for Society

To understand differences in social morality, we must realize that, in the search for peace of mind, man has evolved two plans of campaign. The tendency which has apparently gained the upper hand in modern society is to control instinct from within the mind, to renounce 'evil' impulse—in short, to be 'good.' The more ancient device was in its day an honourable deception. It was to pretend one was not oneself subject to evil impulses, but to discover these impulses in the external world and attack

them. This reaction appears perfectly natural to the primitive savage but the civilized European has a different name for it. Judging solely by the behaviouristic end-product, he calls it 'being bad.' And in a sense the respectable European is right. For the average citizen it is convenient to live in a community in which anti-social conduct is reduced to a low level. But he must not run away with the idea that these older moralities have lost all survival value. Without this system of external attack, it is almost certain that many social reform organizations would go bankrupt. These depend, to a large extent, on the reformer acquiring virtue through attacking the conduct of persons or institutions, which for some reason or another he dislikes. His reasons may be good, bad or indifferent, so long as he can find something to reform. Indeed we have good cause to believe that the presence of a criminal group plays its part in stabilizing the community, mainly because it increases the self-esteem of the more law-abiding citizens. Psychologically regarded, the criminal is a scapegoat and so long as he performs the function of whipping-boy for society, there is no great hope of radical change in criminal law or practice.

These conjectures are confirmed by the investigation of individuals who indulge in the practice of false confession. It is not unknown for people to give themselves up for a murder which they have

not committed. They are not satisfied with unconscious identification with the criminal, they must behave as if they had committed the crime. As a rule this dramatization can be indulged without danger, but not invariably so. It is risky for a child to make his false confessions of sin too convincing to his parents. They are likely to take him at his word. And it is dangerous for an adult to write fairy tales to a clandestine lover about murdering her husband. Some of the highest legal authorities have gravely questioned whether, in the Thompson-Bywaters case, the evidence justified a verdict against the woman. And it was certainly established that she had a strong urge to set down fantasies of murder in writing, a habit which, by the way, is regarded as praiseworthy when indulged by writers of good detective fiction. Fortunately for ourselves the great majority of us are content to secure vicarious satisfaction for our unconscious criminal impulses. We are content to watch the criminal acting out our own fantasies on the stage of life whilst we sit in the stalls and express our disapproval. Very comfortable for us, no doubt, but if this vicarious satisfaction helps to perpetuate crime, it is obviously purchased at too dear a price.

Doctrine of Original Sin

All this leads up to a key formulation about human conduct. Nowadays most natural scientists—and

indeed many churchmen—are inclined to treat the Doctrine of Original Sin with indulgent scepticism. Psycho-analysis, on the contrary, takes the doctrine seriously, but insists on giving it a scientific form. The fact is that, owing to early struggles with our primitive emotions, each one of us is compelled to carry throughout life a heavy load of what, for lack of a better term, we call unconscious guilt—an unconscious sense of sin if you like. None of us can escape this burden because however successful we may be in repressing them our primitive impulses remain highly charged and we are under the constant necessity to control them. When this unconscious load becomes intolerable, it gives rise to an equally unconscious need for punishment or atonement. There are two reasons why this unconscious sense of sin may become intolerable. It may be due to an increase in the strength of the repressed impulses. Alternatively it may be due to excessive action of the unconscious repressing forces. In this latter event the disconcerting situation arises that the more scrupulous the conscious conduct of the individual the more guilty he feels unconsciously. Consciousness cannot keep pace with the moral precautions demanded by the unconscious. I am aware that these ideas of unconscious guilt and punishment may strike you as far-fetched. Yet you have no doubt heard of children who without any apparent cause turn first depressed, then fractious, and later ill-behaved.

Having brought down on themselves some sharp reprimand or physical punishment they suddenly become placid or even gay. And there are vast numbers of adults of whom it is said even by their best friends that they are 'asking for trouble.' By behaving anti-socially the compulsive criminal sees to it that his need for punishment is gratified by society. But the law-abiding citizen has precisely the same need for punishment. The difference is that when *his* instincts cause too much trouble *he falls ill*. He punishes himself by developing one of the innumerable forms of neurotic disorder which are so characteristic of a civilized community.

The Identity of Crime and Punishment

Here again mankind is in a dilemma. From the point of view of our unconscious tensions, criminal behaviour and neurotic illness are not only scapegoat systems but offer society a choice of safety valves. Yet, socially regarded, they are both unsatisfactory expedients, and society is quite within its rights in safeguarding itself against attack. Nevertheless these rights should not be abused. Society has little justification for adopting a superior attitude to the criminal in its midst; international society still less. And however natural it may appear, it has no justification whatsoever for believing that punishment will deter. This fallacy has been exploded over and over again. Punishment may deter the law-

abiding citizen, it will never deter the criminal. On the contrary, we have reason to know that punishment encourages the criminal. For many centuries penal law was based on the supposition that the punishment should fit the crime. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. We now know that the crime fits the punishment. In other words, crime keeps pace with the severities of the age. The greatest mistake that social scientists can make is to isolate the subject-matter of their researches. We cannot hope to understand the criminal unless we investigate the behaviour of the law-abiding citizen to see how far they play into each other's hands. Viewed from this angle the problem of punishment becomes much simplified. Whereas the criminal discharges his fear and aggression by attacking and punishing the peaceable citizen, the peaceable citizen discharges his fears and aggression by attacking and punishing the criminal. This method of approach—namely, to relate so-called normal reactions with so-called abnormal reactions—is a routine procedure in medical science but it has been neglected by social scientists. And I need hardly add that it is vital to the understanding of problems such as those of war and pacifism.

May I add one consideration of an immediately practical nature? In recent years we have observed what is apparently a fresh development in international politics. For some time most nations have

been extremely busy applying the moral precepts and preconceptions of individuals to the sphere of international affairs. But they are not so quick to apply the more practical conclusions about man arrived at after centuries of trial and error. There is quite considerable danger that in a wave of moral enthusiasm the more solid facts of experience may be neglected or thrust aside. Having bolstered up their sense of virtue by setting up a supposedly inhibiting organization such as the League of Nations, the League members are apparently ready to support it by committing every blunder in the psychological calendar. Aggressors must be shown that it does not pay to be aggressive. And in the meanwhile no attempt is made to eliminate the fear which causes the aggression. It is the old nursery heresy in new guise. And it will have the same evil consequences as in the nursery. It will lead to the perpetuation of war. One maxim in particular might be blazoned on the walls of every European Chancellery at this moment. It runs as follows: Punishment may repeat crime; it may indeed perpetuate crime; it will never cure crime.

IV

THE UNCONSCIOUS CAUSES OF WAR*

It is a curious reflection that although man has always been jealous of the privilege of thinking as he likes, his liberties in this direction are being more and more curtailed as time goes on. The physical scientist had wrested from him the right to a common-sense view on his natural surroundings. Common sense tells us that the sun goes round the earth and sets in the west. Astronomers tell us in the roundest possible terms either to disbelieve our own senses or to run away and play. The contest is an unequal one. And man owns defeat by allowing the physical scientist the last word on all technical matters. When, however, the psychologist comes along in his turn to suggest that most social problems require equally unbiassed examination, man naturally grows rebellious. He insists on having his own opinion. For example, mention the subject of war at any time and in any company—immediately

* Whilst drafting this broadcast I was constantly oppressed by the difficulty of doing justice to such a vast subject within the time period allotted. I have given a fuller account of the relations of War to Peace and Pacifism in a small book entitled *War, Sadism and Pacifism* (Allen and Unwin). This contains also an outline of research from which it can be gathered how meagre our information on the subject still is.

the atmosphere becomes charged with emotional bias. It soon becomes clear that each person is ready to tolerate only those preconceived theories and remedies which promise him peace of mind. War, we are told in times of peace, is a savage survival, a crime, insane folly, a threat to civilization. In times of war, the same people tell us that it is a disagreeable necessity embarked on to save civilization. War, we are told, is due to man's original sin, to the capitalist system, to the existence of national boundaries, to the greed of armament manufacturers or to the insanity of dictators; and we are advised accordingly to search our own hearts, to turn communist, to support internationalism, to curb the 'merchants of death' or to make the world safe for democracy. For the moment we are not concerned with the validity of any of these suggestions. The important point is that in all this welter of confused and confusing counsel there seems little hope of any objective examination of the causes of war. We are so busy maintaining that one war is a threat to civilization or that a different kind of war might save civilization, that the essential problem remains neglected—namely, whether war is or is not part of civilization.

What is Civilization?

But what after all is civilization? On investigation we find that the term is really a judgment passed

on the behaviour of individual man or of any one group. The judgment is arrived at by a process of comparison. For example the average Englishman compares his own modes of satisfying or controlling instinct with those current in other countries. Naturally he concludes that with a few very dubious exceptions he is more civilized than other nationals and certainly more civilized than the savage. He will point out that his individual and social habits give evidence of greater love and less hate than those of other countries or of his own country at earlier times. And he feels that although America has better plumbing and France better cooking, still, on the whole, English methods of satisfying individual self-preservation take a lot of beating. Even if his devotion to the fine arts lags behind European standards, at any rate he is kind to animals, foxes always excepted. In short, that overworked observer of human frailties, a visitor from the planet Mars, might well inquire whether civilization is not after all simply a state of mind, a feeling of self-satisfaction.

I am sorry if I should appear to digress too much. But if ever there was a time when it was necessary to clear our minds of cant that time is now. Man's inveterate tendencies to idealize himself, to play the reformed rake or to cover his self-interest behind a mask of hypocrisy may be excellent subjects for the peace-time satirist: during the war phases of any century they are more dangerous than the

plague. Late twentieth century historians looking back on the causes of the present European crisis will have little difficulty in establishing that one of the main causes of war tension was a sudden attack of smugness by means of which our administrators covered their fears. It is all the more important therefore to be as clear as possible about the exact nature of civilization. There are two ways of defining civilization. The more fundamental is to regard it as a process of delaying the gratification of instinct. This delay is achieved by the help of various unconscious mechanisms. By this delay man secures time for better adaptation and so differentiates himself—not, by the way, from the savage but from the lower animals. The more practical test of a civilization is the degree of control of hate, fear and irrationality. Judged by the first test, that is to say the capacity to adapt through delay in gratification of instinct, there has been no essential difference between the European and the savage since cannibalism was abolished amongst savages. As to the hate and irrationality tests we are accustomed to think that by comparison with the savage we make a brave show, but on the outbreak of modern warfare by whomever it is waged, the laurels pass to the savage. Not that this is any particular credit to the savage, who has only to thank his own backwardness of social organization for the compliment.

—*Is War a Part of it?*

I hope you will excuse me, therefore, If I do not spend much time in proving to you that the mechanisms which bring about war and the phenomena of war are identical in the European and the primitive. As I have explained at some length elsewhere, man's first step in civilization was essentially animistic, projecting his dangerous impulses on to other creatures or objects. This accounted in large part for his hostility towards external objects. No matter how much we may try to conceal the fact behind pious idealizations this mechanism is in full swing in all countries at the present day. I have also described how important deep currents of repressed sexuality are, not only in bringing about the solidarity of groups, but in preserving a constant war-readiness between groups. These factors are perhaps more obvious in savage tribes where minor war expeditions frequently start after sexual affronts from another tribe; boasting at ceremonial feasts of success in love affairs was, as Professor Seligman tells us, a recognized source of minor warfare in the Archipelago of New Guinea. But although these more superficial sexual factors no longer give rise to war in modern Europe unconscious sexual factors in war are just as powerful as ever.

Again, just as in times of peace we project our sexual waywardness on to, say, the French, so in

times of war we accuse our enemy of the moment of atrocities. You may recall that during the last Great War there were three main types of atrocity rumour spread in the Allied countries about the Germans. They were accused of sexual offences in occupied territories, of crucifying and sometimes of castrating prisoners. Two of these charges were, you will observe, sexual in type and were made by individuals who would no doubt have snorted with indignation if a psychologist had suggested that sexual factors play their part in war. Now it is profitable in this connection to study the evolution of the modern system of taking prisoners of war. The various stages can indeed still be observed in the war-customs of savages. The more archaic forms of killing without quarter were accompanied by cannibalistic ceremonies with or without the preservation of the head or genital organs. The substitution of slave-taking with or without castration of the slave was a transitional stage, which has gradually developed into the systems of taking prisoners now followed by most civilized nations. But the practices of slave-taking and castration of prisoners have not yet been abandoned. To give one timely example they are prevalent in certain East African tribes to the present day, a fact which some European countries have good cause to remember and which others in their high moral enthusiasm find it convenient to forget.

If you are interested in the subject read up the history of warfare from the earliest recorded times, make a comparative study of existing methods or rituals, weapons, charms, tactics, trophies, peace negotiations, victory celebrations, war monuments and preparations for the next war as observed in parts of the globe as distant as the Solomon Islands or as near as Europe. Trace the relation between homicide and public warfare in primitive tribes, between civil and inter-State warfare. Observe the innumerable transitional forms to be detected in both primitive and civilized communities. Study the history of the vendetta or of gangster feuds. You will find little evidence that war is a savage survival, and very weighty evidence that it is part of the balance-sheet of civilization which the European tries to disavow by the time-worn expedient of saying that his own wars are righteous wars and everyone else's wrong. And all the time the ghastly irony of warfare remains for both European and savage. War is not an outburst of the old Adam, but a primitive attempt to control our own impulses which ends in our attacking the old Adam in others. At the time it may promote peace of mind and secure greater cohesion in the group. Politicians have long been aware of the fact and have not been slow to take advantage of it. But when the day of reckoning comes that cohesion has already gone far to become revolutionary disintegration in both victor and vanquished.

The Dangers of Pacifism

Let us turn from the consideration of war phenomena to the more vital task of analysing peace and pacifism. In the past the militarist was invariably saddled with the sole responsibility for war. In all future wars the co-equal responsibility of the pacifist will engage the attention of the historian. To justify this apparently wilful paradox I must amplify a little what I have told you about the development of mental mechanisms controlling human impulse.

I have said that man's first step in mental evolution consisted in developing animistic views of life; in other words in projecting his own hatreds on to the external world. A more remarkable step was to come. Man recognized the power of secretly controlling impulse by turning it on himself. You are no doubt ready to agree that man can love himself to the point of infatuation, but that he should ever seriously hate himself may seem improbable. It is easy to prove, however, that a considerable number of individuals not only hate themselves with bitter and implacable hatred, but that under the influence of this passion they will not stop short of condemning themselves to death. Curiously enough, the law—usually an obtuse psychological instrument—has recognized this particular form of homicidal fury. It is still a crime to commit suicide—in other words to murder

oneself. Now of course we do not all commit suicide, but we have learned from study of that form of insanity called melancholia, as well as from the analysis of children and adults, that the process, which in abnormal cases may end in suicide, exists also in all normal persons. The difference is that in normal people the inturnd aggressiveness of man is used up in the form of scrutiny or criticism of impulse, and also in various forms of inhibition and control. What we consciously call the pangs of conscience and the processes of critical judgment represent the most superficial products of this activity. But you must believe me when I say that as with the projection of dangerous impulse, so this turning of aggressive impulse on the self is, for the most part, an unconscious and incredibly primitive process. What is more, it bears little relation to the external realities of life.

I am well aware that observations of the scanty sort I have given do not appear to warrant drawing major conclusions as to the character of man or the behaviour of groups. I can only hope for the indulgence which is usually accorded time-harassed lecturers on popular science. Man's mind is a composite structure, and the mechanisms it puts in operation have the most complicated interrelations. At a modest estimate there are about a dozen unconscious mechanisms which are essential to the smooth working of the mind, all of them closely

interlocked. Nevertheless the two main varieties I have described, namely the temporary mastery of instinct by projecting it on to external objects, and the absorption of frustrated external impulse by turning it back on the self, are responsible for the most important patterns of human behaviour. Without discounting for a moment the significance of other mechanisms, these two alone enable us to make predictions as to human conduct. An individual who worries a good deal about contamination, is faddy about his food and devoted to fresh air and exercise, is liable to have friction in his social relations, for example, to get on the wrong side of the works-manager. On the other hand a person with an undue sense of inferiority, a tendency to inflict a number of minor physical hurts on himself, to endure minor humiliations, or who shows reactions of over-scrupulosity, is exceedingly unlikely ever to become a works-manager. But it would not be right to suggest that the first type was a pure projector or that the second did nothing else but turn impulse back on himself. All we can say is that on the whole they favour one particular type of reaction. By way of contrast there are many apparently well-balanced people who alternate in the use of these two mechanisms. There are others again whose main characteristic is one of mental immobility or even inertia. In such instances there is a direct conflict between the two mechanisms. There are times during

a wrestling bout when the combatants appear to be immobile, but we all know that this apparent immobility is due to the balance of powerful muscular efforts. I mention all this in order to emphasize the fact that the most incalculable people (and in a sense the most dangerous) are those who deal with their aggression by the alternating process or whose balance of intuned and projected aggression is insecurely maintained.

If you are prepared to concede these possibilities we may proceed with some confidence to sort out different types amongst those who, whether they call themselves pacifist or not, are consciously opposed to war. For example, the ordinary peaceable man is under ordinary circumstances really peaceable. For this reason we do not usually stop to ask whether or not his peaceableness is due to a balance of opposing forces. But on occasions of stress it becomes patent that his stability is somewhat precarious. A very slight stimulus may be all that is necessary to turn him into an aggressive and unreasoning animal. Reinforce one or other of the opposing tendencies in his mind, incite him by the fear of an external enemy, as militarist papers do, or inflame his indignation by dilating on the wrongdoing of someone else, as pacifist papers do, and the immediate results are not difficult to calculate. He will throw himself with unexpected force and enthusiasm into a cause which a few days before he knew nothing of and in

all probability still does not understand. Like most high explosives, the man-in-the-street looks extremely harmless and in fact will only respond to the appropriate stimulus. When that stimulus is given, he is extremely liable to explode. This is the kind of dangerous stuff which newspaper editors play with during a crisis. And just as schoolboys may start hammering the fuse of an unexploded shell or mine, so it may be said that our publicists play with human passions with a magnificent recklessness which is born of ignorance.

The Fallacy of Righteous Causes

When I said above that the ordinary mortal is a peaceable person, I did not mean to imply thereby that he is a pacifist. The pacifist is quite a different mortal. And he is by no means easy to examine. Like that sea-animal, the squid, who when investigated throws out a dark inky cloud for self-protection, the pacifist claims and often is granted exemption from investigation on the grounds that his intentions are honourable. This arrogation of privilege lays on the pacifist a heavy burden of responsibility; for, if we may not examine his motives, he must make terribly certain that his preconceived ideas and plans are accurate. A brief examination of this type is sufficient to show that he has much in common with the aggressive type he so openly despises. For one reason or another he hates war,

and he hates it aggressively, just as some law-abiding people hate the criminal aggressively. Mentally he will stop at nothing to attain his ends, in some cases physically also. To judge from the flagrant example of the Peace Ballot it would appear that in his moralistic enthusiasm the pacifist has little regard for the decencies of scientific investigation, to say nothing of a desire for objective truth. Suppose that a Society for Preventing the Spread of Cholera wished to ascertain the real attitude of the public towards preventive measures, that it produced an alleged "ballot form" which was not at all secret, that on this form were a number of questions to which the answer 'Yes' or 'No' could not reasonably be returned, that it prepared an explanatory form in which one side only of the problem was expounded: finally that a number of biassed canvassers were sent to persuade the voters by hook or by crook to answer as the organizers of the ballot desired. Would the result of such a propagandist drive give the slightest indication of how the voters would actually behave in the presence of a cholera epidemic? The only conclusion to be drawn from the result of the Peace Ballot is that it is difficult for many people to withstand the pressure of pious sentiments, especially when these sentiments are backed by all the elaborate technique of social propaganda, a fact which was already common knowledge. Scientifically regarded the whole manœuvre

produces the most painful impression. And it is not without danger. No doubt the result was pretty accurately assessed by the more cynical amongst European diplomats, but it is always possible that our own Government might, out of panic, take it at its face value. Indeed it is quite evident from the truculent tone of their leading articles that Radical and other pacifist newspapers hope the Government can be so influenced. The reason for this can now be stated. The pacifist's control of his own unconscious aggression is in a state of uneasy equilibrium. The energies which drive him have precisely the same source as those which motivate war. They may come through different channels, but they are the same energies. It is small wonder therefore that when his indignation is inflamed by what he regards as the inexcusable conduct of others, he should begin to toy with measures which are liable sooner or later to cause the very outbreak he professes to be anxious to avoid.

A well-known pacifist once remarked to me rather plaintively: "But are we never to get credit for our good intentions? Whatever you may say we have the sincerest faith in our own ideals. And we believe them to be essentially practical. What about the League of Nations, for instance?" No one of course questions the good faith of any sincere pacifist. What one questions is the reliability of their mental institutions. It is certainly true that people who turn

their deeper aggressive drives back on themselves in the form of moral and ethical scrutiny show signs of extreme conscience-formation. Their ideals are high, and should their conduct fall short of these ideals the result is a depressed sense of inferiority. But it does not follow that because they show signs of excessive conscience formation this state of mind is a very desirable one or indeed that the standards they apply to themselves are suitable for others. On the contrary these very signs should warn us to examine their social ideals with the utmost care. The League of Nations may be a practical scheme developed to meet realistic problems in a common-sense way. Or again it may not. Time does not permit me to discuss the matter.* But the most interesting fact about the League is that it is a projection of man's own mental structure. The idea of an ethical super-state which curbs the bad impulses of naughty ego-centric nations is an exact parallel to the conscience activities of the individual. And there can be no doubt that a large proportion of pacifist enthusiasm for the League can be related to the uneasy function of the pacifist's own conscience. Some day no doubt a representative group of enthusiastic pacifists may be prevailed upon in the interests of science to have their individual conflicts and projection mechanisms measured. And the results will no doubt be startling. In the mean-

* See Appendix 1.

time it is well to remember that when individuals fall short of their own unconscious standards they are liable to have a passionate devotion to ideals outside an immediately personal range. Spurred by this passion they may take up in relation to the League an attitude which they would regard as reprehensible if expressed in terms of national feeling. In times of peace pacifists are ready to jeer at the Chauvinist battle-cry "My country, right or wrong," but not a few are ready at the merest threat of war to raise their voices crying "The League, right or wrong." Such persons should be the last to pass judgment on either nationalism or internationalism.

For these amongst many other reasons, it is essential that the anti-war measures of the pacifist should be as carefully scrutinized as the pro-war plans of the militarist. It should not be lightly assumed that the suggestions of the righteously indignant are necessarily practical. On the contrary the very first question one should ask about the schemes of the righteously indignant is whether these plans are not likely to precipitate rather than prevent an outbreak of war. Looking back on the attacks of plague which ravaged Europe in the Middle Ages, we are able to assess the value of the preventive measures employed. We now know that the habit of warding off dangerous effluvia by carrying nose-gays was pathetically inadequate. On the other

hand, Solomon Eagle's view that the Great Plague was a visitation of Providence is now known to be bacteriologically unsound. Incidentally no one raised the question whether one brand of plague was good or another bad, or whether it was possible to cure one plague by spreading another. Fine indignation and idealism did not help. The issue at stake was solely and simply one of prevention.

Preventive Measures

No doubt many of you who belong to what I have called the peaceable group may think that a first step in war prevention is to muzzle both militarists and pacifists, or at any rate to muzzle their newspapers. But that is scarcely fair. So long as peaceable people react with almost complete inertia to the problem of war, they lie under suspicion of unconsciously fostering war. More active steps are necessary. And logically the first step is to investigate causes. But this involves applying the methods of science to the problem, a plan which, as I pointed out earlier, is calculated to arouse considerable opposition. Yet the alternative is obviously either to trust to the efficacy of pious hopes or to embark on gigantic gambles with Fate. You will scarcely believe me when I tell you that the League of Nations from the day of its inception has not spent a single penny trying to find out why man goes to war or how

he succeeds in remaining at peace. Man has shouted about the proximate causes of war until our ears are deafened with a confused clamour. And the last war is no sooner over than historians are busy proving that the causes alleged on the outbreak were not the true causes. The ostensible causes of the 1914 outbreak have long been discredited. Even now, all we know for certain is that it was not 'a war to end war.' And in the meantime we have taken no steps whatsoever to eliminate even the most superficial of causes. As for those secret forces which have driven men at each others' throats since the dawn of history—man, on the savage principle that what he doesn't know can't hurt him, is content to bury his head in the sand, like the ostrich whose intelligence he affects to ridicule.

All this you may say is very cold comfort. You cannot afford to fiddle with scientific theories whilst Rome burns. But that is merely an attempt to blame the scientist for your own inertia or to saddle him with your own sense of hopelessness. Malaria was not stamped out any the quicker because man disliked the delays of laboratory investigation. In the meantime he was always free to use quinine. The group psychologist can retort with some reason that you need not remain idle. War is always open to experimental attack. One of the very first steps is the application of common honesty to the problem of proximate causes. Even the most reformed rake

amongst nations has not so far had the courage to attempt this course. We talk vaguely about fear causing war, but we do nothing to allay the fears of war-prone countries: on the contrary, we see every country's self-interest save our own. The most sinister feature about pacifist activities during the 1935 crisis was the readiness with which various groups dropped their pet theories of war causation to support a supposed idealistic crusade. Socialist lions were ready to forget their economic theories and treat their hereditary enemies as capitalist lambs—so long as the lambs supported the League of Nations. Capitalist countries with an adequate supply of war-fuel were quick to assert that applying oil sanctions to an oil-less ally was motivated solely by an idealistic desire for peace. A comparative hush descended on the 'merchants of death' campaign of sundry Radical and pacifist newspapers. And although a little lip service was rendered to the plan of reducing the anxieties of aggressor countries, the matter was not pursued at the very time when effective action and reassurance were most necessary. The reason was obvious. Any purposive action in this direction would have split the temporarily integrated pacifist movement into the antagonistic elements of which it was constituted.

Time does not permit an elaborate analysis of those immediate causes. It is enough to suggest that

measures directed at controlling the instruments of war are of little significance compared with those aimed at alleviating the fears of nations. Such fears will be found invariably to be connected with the frustration of man's own instincts and must be dealt with accordingly. But they cannot be dealt with effectively until man turns to advantage what he already knows of the psychology of leadership. It is essential that peaceable men should capture the key points in peace administration; and this in turn involves a fresh political orientation. For example, just as militarists should be excluded from War Departments, so pacifists should be prohibited from holding office in the League of Nations or acting as peace delegates, or as Foreign Secretaries. A third move is an essay in counter-suggestion. It involves a mobilization of the opinion of peaceable men who are ready to say 'A plague o' both your houses' to pacifist and militarist alike. But this counter-suggestion must be based on objective truth, not on the vapours of idealism. You have at any rate the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that every other method of attempting to secure peace is nothing more nor less than a gambler's throw by which there is no certainty that the best man will win. These are not the idle armchair speculations of a psychoanalyst. Only recently our own Prime Minister admitted in so many words that the latest form of

pacifist manœuvring was a gamble. "We are treading a new path," said Mr. Baldwin, "and we cannot tell what that path will turn out to be." A more sincere tribute to the dangers of human ignorance could scarcely be imagined.

AN UNCENSORED TALK ON POLITICS*

IN these humdrum days when most quarters of the globe have already been charted, one of the few geographical adventures left to man is the exploration of his unconscious mind. Even the simplest talk about this inner world is spiced with excitement. We endeavour to explore the subject of crime and strike at once on the unconscious guilt of the respectable. We try to describe the unequal battle of peace-loving men against the combined forces of militarists and pacifists: and in times of war we are lucky to escape a charge of high treason. With what common-sense reflections then shall we shrive ourselves before facing the dangers of talking about politics?

* As indicated in the Preface this broadcast was withdrawn at the last moment at the request of the Talks Executive of the B.B.C. It is only fair to add that the draft finally submitted did not contain any of the allusions to current political affairs which are given here. It was felt by the Executive that even in a censored form the broadcast would be regarded by many listeners as tendentious, and in view of the existence of a General Election no course short of withdrawal seemed possible. The author was at the time in entire sympathy with the attitude of the B.B.C., but feels that he is no longer subject to the need for political discretion to which the B.B.C. must perforce subscribe. He has therefore replaced the allusions to current political affairs.

Well, I suggest that we start with a definition. Ideally speaking politics is simply a form of applied science, applied sociology—a science of human relations. Here no doubt you begin to think—in the earlier manner of H. G. Wells—of cool laboratories, high-domed young scientists in overalls, and blue prints for world organization, pigeon-holed somewhere high up in the Himalayas. And comparing these images with more work-a-day realities, such, for example, as your Parliamentary candidate's election address, you may feel just a little depressed. Fortunately these more mundane observations on the habits of politicians do not invalidate the definition of politics. They merely indicate that applied sociology is in a backward state: rather like the science of astronomy or chemistry in the Middle Ages. You may recall perhaps that in mediaeval times scientific issues so inflamed the passions of the orthodox that the scientist was liable to have the last word in the debate read to him as he perished on a bonfire provided by his adversaries.

Politics the Sanctuary of Unreason

One of the healthiest signs of post-war times is the degree of contempt into which politics and political leaders have fallen. Political leaders have themselves become increasingly concerned by the degree of indifference with which important issues are met by many electors. It is not simply that our

modern generation is more flippant in its attitude to political matters than was the case in Victorian times. It has become thoroughly disillusioned. Indeed it is evident that before new political eras can be inaugurated the older superstitions and idealizations must go by the board. How primitive these superstitions are can be gathered by recalling, for instance, the famous Zinovief letter. Looking back we can see that the force invoked by the Conservative Party to smash the Socialist Party at the polls was not reason but persecutory fear. The bewhiskered Bolshevik of the cartoons frightened political children in the same way that nurses in the Napoleonic era used to send babies to sleep by threatening them with Boney. And the same can be remarked of such slogans as 'Your investments are in danger,' or 'Your bread will cost you more.' They arouse almost insane fears which are only dormant in the average elector's imagination. On the other hand the dark stories spread by Socialists of capitalist conspiracies invoke precisely the same animistic reactions. Yet in the same breath Socialists will charge Capitalists with a stupidity which would obviously exclude them from the ranks of intelligent conspirators. These emotional contradictions are not absent from current politics. Recently a Socialist peer noted for his vitriolic attacks on opponents, charged the National Government with bad faith on the score that as all parties were agreed on the

main issue there was no need for an election. In the same breath he belaboured the same Government for every stupidity under the sun, obviously indicating that the sooner it was kicked out the better. Almost as ludicrous were the idealizations of a semi-religious type which flourished in pre-war days, and for that matter still flourish. A well-known Radical journalist was so convinced of the divine mission of his party that he could scarcely chronicle the appearance of an outsize vegetable marrow without implying that this was due one way or another to the vitalizing forces of Liberalism.

But I need not remind you of the parrot cries of Parliamentary elections, the inspiring speeches of political wizards, which scarcely bear reading in the cold light of the next morning, the suggestions and counter-suggestions, the appeals to the prestige of leaders, to ignorance, cupidity, jealousy, fear, combativeness or plain hate; the thousand and one tricks of innuendo which indicate to what primitive levels political leaders and newspaper editors sink in their quinquennial orgies. I think you will agree that political activity as it exists to-day is largely a battle of half-truths in which objective reality is invariably sacrificed. But although it would appear that the utmost either democracy or autocracy can promise us is the perpetuation of unreason in the form of social codes, there is no cause to despair. On the contrary, granted that current

politics are conducted by the irrational for the irrational, it is clear that our first task must be to examine the causes of political irrationality. I suggested in earlier broadcasts that irrationality is in the main an antiquated form of reason. But it is something more. It is a grievance, a rebellion of hidden instincts against neglect. The more unreasonable a person is, the more certain we can be that his current life is flouting some essential need. In a sense an insane asylum is a concentration camp of discontented Utopists. Every insane person is an idealist who, driven by his own imperious needs, has shattered his mind against a world of hard facts. And obviously it should be the duty of a true political scientist to uncover and alleviate the discontents, fears and grievances which drive man back to unreason.

The Swing of the Pendulum

Now from the point of view of immediate adaptation one of the most irrational of political phenomena is what is called the swing of the political pendulum. We find parties or political systems swinging between one extreme and the other. Rights and Lefts—Communists and Diehard Conservatives—Whites and Reds. This essentially boyish arrangement may be all right when the political issues are really emotional, but when some realistic problem of adaptation is at stake it is almost as absurd as the wearing of red, white, black or green shirts. Think what

would have happened had the problem of wireless been a political issue. The Diehards would have been shocked to the marrow to think of debauching the poor with universal wireless. Socialists would have discovered a Capitalist Plot to deny man his Rights to Wireless. Liberals, whilst securing the interests of wireless manufacturers, would have favoured wireless for all, provided that no mention was made in broadcasts of drink, betting or Tariff Reform. Anyhow it is quite certain that for roughly twenty years the development of wireless would have been held up. Over and over again in the history of man revolutions have been effected in his social life by the combined efforts of scientists, inventors and industrialists, and all the while politicians have been busy discussing whether these revolutions are either possible or proper. We mustn't forget, however, that this boyish game of Rights and Lefts is not without its uses in stabilizing the community. Political battles absorb energies which might otherwise drive man towards war. This is easy to prove. Consider how often political crises actually end in civil or military violence. The Home Rule controversy threatened to end so. The Nazi movement, the Fascist movement, the Communist movement did in fact lead to every variety of violence. The rational historian tells us, of course, that these outbursts were simply unfortunate accidents, necessities merely incidental to these move-

ments. The psychologist maintains that the outbursts were not simply the outcome of bad politics but happen when politics do not drain off or satisfy unconscious aggression. In addition, politics gratify in a very realistic way the personal antagonisms of the electors: family hatreds and jealousies, fear of the older or younger generations, antagonism between the sexes and a multitude of other reactions which do not get free expression in individual life. In short, political activity is a spontaneous form of psychotherapy for the group.

Political Psychology of the Left

Our first problem now emerges more clearly. On what foundations shall we build up a new political creed without jeopardizing the function which current politics subserve of ventilating emotional stresses? The answer is clear. We must first discover what are the central aims of civilization. Having done this we must inquire whether those aims are adapted to meet the stresses of primitive instinct of man. Now, I have hinted before that most talk about civilization is simply an exercise in self-deception. Yet we can lay down good empirical tests of civilization, in particular the criterion that a good civilization should reduce the fear, hate and irrationality of man. And we now know that these fears are a response to unsuitable control of instinct. So we may well pause to consider in what manner

various political parties deal with problems of human instinct. Take, for example, the political creed of the Communist, who, despite cries of 'wolf' from his opponents, is the only politician who seems to know what he wants, and who pursues his aim with a truly religious enthusiasm. Now the Communist interpretation of history is almost exclusively in terms of economic relations between the individual and the State. The Communist does not deny that man has other interests, but the regulation of these interests in a Communist State is in theory secondary to economic organization or necessity. Translating all this into psychological terms we may say that the Communist recognizes only one primary instinct, the instinct of self-preservation. Hence we may say with certainty that however long Communism may hold political and military power, whether it be for thirty or three hundred years, as is quite possible, it is doomed to ultimate failure. Even though it should solve the economic problems of the world, no political party can hope to remain a permanent influence which does not pay as much attention to man's love, needs and hate tensions, in other words to his conflicts, as it does to the instincts of self-preservation.

The Right

But how do the parties of the Right behave? It is clear that they too are very actively concerned

with the impulses of self-preservation. In fact they are frequently accused by Socialists of fostering the interests of one class exclusively. Naturally the Right resents these accusations and responds by making counter-accusations of self-interest against the Left. The vigorous abuse of both sides suggests, of course, that both accusations are substantially correct. But it does not follow that the interests of the Right are limited solely to economic issues. Indeed it is evident that whether by good luck or good guidance they have not committed the psychological blunder of putting all their political eggs in one basket. Compare, for example, the attitude of the extreme Right and extreme Left to religion. The Communist has openly avowed that religion is a sort of dope which drugs the worker into a passive attitude to his conditions, in other words that the priest acts as a flunkey to capitalist conspirators. Now on the whole, whatever the private opinions of individuals may be, the Right openly supports the maintenance of the Church. By so doing it admits the existence of human conflict as distinct from self-preservative needs. The same is true of Conservative attitudes to the drink problem. You may recall the contemptuous references of late Victorian Radicals to Mr. Bung the Brewer. It was openly suggested that the Right depended largely on brewers with an eye to their dividends. Incidentally the accusation came with an ill grace from a party which openly

championed the virtues of soft drinks. But in any case it was in the long run a compliment to the Right. Supplying the demand for alcohol no doubt raises the issue of private or public ownership but it would be foolish to pretend that this is the only issue involved. The consumption of alcohol by man is essentially a psychological problem. It is an admission by man that he needs adventitious aid in dealing with his unconscious conflicts. The blind application of policies of inhibition to the needs of a community can be even more disastrous than the social consequences of excessive drinking, as soon became apparent during the American experiment in Prohibition. By preserving some of the liberties of the individual to consume alcohol if he feels so disposed, the Right has established some claim to being psychologically minded. Proceeding along these lines it is possible to subject the most naïve election address to a psychological analysis. Leaving out the usual padding of political fustian, we can see that the extreme Left, although much more logical in its application of economic theories to social organization, is psychologically blind. The extreme Right, though much more timid, even cowardly, in regard to systems of social self-preservation does not make economic issues the sole measure of adaptation. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it admits that there are human problems other than those of primary self-preservation. This

may be no particular compliment to the Right but it is nevertheless a fact.

The Centre

No doubt some of you will feel inclined to ask 'What about the Centre parties: is political compromise not the solution?' Now compromise is all very well if there are two opposing half-truths at issue. But otherwise it is not only sterile but paralyzing. If we examine the existing Centre parties in Britain, which include young Tory democrats, Liberals, a few Radicals and those Labour Affiliations whose members know nothing of Socialism but vaguely support it, we find no evidence that they have sounder political intuitions than the extreme Rights and Lefts. When they are right they are a little less right than the others, when they are wrong they are a little less wrong. They are less cohesive, frequently represent isolated interests, pay a good deal of lip service to reason, and like all parties who render this lip service they have a profound faith in the virtues of inhibition. It is this rather self-righteous political prudery which arouses the indignation and mockery of Mr. A. P. Herbert. But however sound Mr. Herbert's intuitions may be, a one-man party is not without its dangers. Recently we have all been very busy telling each other how horrid dictators are. And obviously there is a risk that the peculiarities of outlook of

the individual dictator—anti-Jewish obsessions for example—may be incorporated in the laws of the land. And although it may be true that when a dictator's ideas are good they are very very good, still dictatorship does ignore the democratic principle that every nation has the right to be stupid in its own way. In short, we must recognize three facts about present-day politics. The pendulum swing of politics is a wasteful system based more on individual passions than on reason. To arrest the swing in the centre is, however, to ignore the forces which move the pendulum. Finally it is a waste of energy on the part of the extreme Right to regard the Left as evil, and it is a waste of energy on the part of the extreme Left to deny the psychological forces from which the Right derives its strength.

Indeed the intransigence of political extremists is not only fatuous but rather pathetic. It is curious to reflect that as far as psychological attitude goes the extreme Right and the extreme Left have a great deal in common. The Diehard and the Communist are brothers under the skin. It has often been observed that when the born Conservative changes his political views, usually after puberty, he usually becomes more extreme in tendency than a Socialist born in working-class surroundings. It is equally well known that when an enthusiastic Socialist changes his politics in the thirties he gravi-

tates towards Diehard Conservatism. Perhaps more significant is the sense of virtue which inflexible extremists enjoy when attacking their opponents. This is perhaps the most striking proof that extremists are psychologically akin, in this case of course brothers-at-feud. These familial attitudes in politics and the changes they undergo at different phases of sexual ripening, maturity and decay are all very well, but they have the disadvantages of all displaced reactions. They have little or nothing to do with the case. And the ordinary reasonable elector may be excused if in his boredom with the eternal squabbling of political factions he feels inclined to abandon all political effort.

The Rôle of the Elector

You see then that the ordinary elector is in rather a quandary. He cannot reasonably associate himself with any of the political parties. But this view if pursued logically would lead him to disfranchise himself: he would refuse to vote at all on the ground that whilst all parties had no doubt something sensible to say, none of them could really be trusted to look after the interests of the community as a whole. Or if he did vote he would be compelled to spoil his paper by voting for all candidates. The situation is somewhat easier for the opportunist. He can cast his vote according to what he conceives to be the main issue of the day, reserving the

freedom to vote on the opposite side next election. Or he can play the political parties at their own game of Rights and Lefts: he can vote one time on one side and the next time on the other. He can vote against a party whose existing majority is too great, or he can make a practice of always voting against the existing majority. Under present circumstances opportunism on the part of the elector although anathema to party organizers is really quite sound. In any case the only alternative for the elector who holds views of his own on social organization is to express these views either in private conversation with himself and others or through the medium of small societies having a propagandist aim. All parties have long since agreed that it is unconstitutional to have an unsuccessful revolution.

But it would be manifestly unfair to limit an analysis of political manifestations to the peculiarities of political parties or their leaders. I have said that the responsibility for war lies ultimately on those peaceable people who do nothing about it, that the responsibility for crime is on the shoulders of those respectable people who pay little conscious attention to criminals. In the same sense the ultimate responsibility for political forms rests on those who apparently have no political urges whatsoever. I have suggested that the apathy of electors is to some extent a measure of the contempt into which

politics have fallen. But the tendency is not entirely new. Even when politics were taken seriously and the majority of voters were caught up in the excitement of a General Election there was always a section of the electorate whose undecided attitude gave party organizers sleepless nights. Obviously, then, we cannot account adequately for political swings either by attributing them solely to the driving energy of political extremists, or by saying that political extremists work on the suggestibility of the mass. The spontaneous movements of this mass may in themselves prove decisive. The mass is, however, unaware that it is moving. These unconscious movements cannot be exactly described but we can suggest them by means of an illustration. Imagine a torpid hippopotamus floating with most of its carcase submerged, an easy target for the pea-shooters of urchins standing on the banks. It would not be surprising if without being particularly aware of the fusillade the animal slowly turned over. And so it is with many dramatic political movements. By the time the political leaders have given self-congratulatory dinners to celebrate the victory of their principles the electoral monster has relapsed once more into its torpid sleep. To some extent it is no doubt fortunate that on these occasions man's unconscious merely stirs in his sleep. Otherwise political life might prove to be a series of recurring revolutions. On the other

hand if the energies of an enlightened electorate were released there would be no end to the possibilities of social adaptation.

Politics versus Culture Transmission

Having expressed dissatisfaction with existing political creeds, the psychologist may well be asked whether he has anything better to offer. All I have suggested so far is that the central aim of politics should be the reduction of unreasoning fear in man, and that this can only be achieved if we give a fair share of attention to all man's instincts, leaving none of his needs in an acutely explosive state. The next step is simple. In talking politics we are apt to assume that our sole concern is with adult man. Professors of genetics on the other hand tell us not to bother too much about adult man, implying that he is beyond redemption. Communists say much the same about the adult bourgeois. However accurate these views are—and there is a great deal to be said for them—it is certainly true that the most important political problem of any age is the problem of the oncoming generation. At least two-thirds of the world's organization should be directly concerned with the needs of children.

Let me indicate to you very briefly just how revolutionary such a view is. Suppose it is established that most women ought to have children; further that they ought to have at least three chil-

dren; still further that most mothers should undertake the whole-time job of looking after their own children until at least the age of four; where would these suppositions lead us politically? Obviously the State would have to see to it that for at least eight to ten years mothers should have no part in industry. Their remuneration of whatever form during this time should be the highest in the community, for the simple reason that they are undertaking the most skilled whole-time job in the world. In addition, a family-man's working day during the same eight to ten years should not exceed four to five hours, so that he may have time, if desirable, to eat and play together with his own family. Suppose further that the best way to educate children between the ages of four to seven is to have little dame-schools with a maximum of ten pupils to each school and four teachers to each ten children, obviously the State would have to provide and staff dozens of little schools in every street. In fact, following up two alone out of scores of the most elementary psychological standpoints, our new political party would soon find itself in the intriguing situation of being violently opposed by Communists as well as Diehard Conservatives; and not only by political parties but by those who favour industrial organization, by formal educationalists, churchmen, feminists and all who are fundamentally afraid of children or antagonistic to family life. I can at least promise you

excitement if you join the as yet unborn Culture Transmission Party.

In the meantime we mustn't neglect the unfortunate adult who when all is said and done is going to be called on to pay the piper. Admittedly we can't do much with the adult except see that his problems of work and leisure are solved to the best of our abilities. But the question is: Do we use our abilities? The answer is equally simple: We do not. Not a thousandth part of our abilities. And why? Because from the moment we draw breath our fears are played on, our antagonisms aroused, our sense of property perverted, our affections split, our intelligence blunted, our obstinacy stirred and our imagination maimed. Add to all this that we are almost naturally animistic. We have persecutory fears and exaggerated anxieties. We suspect plots and counter-plots. And we turn these suspicions into realities. Communists fear and hate Fascists; Fascists fear and hate Communists. They revile, slander and finally shoot each other when they can. Small wonder then that the organization of a nation's work and leisure compares so miserably with that of the lower animals. Indeed compares so unfavourably with that of any health committee in the most backward rural county. Because fortunately for man there are neutral territories where his political passions are curbed and where, undisturbed by passion, he gets on with the work of adaptation.

The Ultimate Problem

I may as well confess now that the definition of politics I offered you earlier, although true enough in its way, was not entirely disinterested. The more we emphasize the fact that politics is an applied science, the less likely we are to be disturbed by political passions. And I was loath to disturb your political passions. But in any case it is necessary to amplify the definition. Politics is something more than applied sociology. When in the course of mental evolution man developed consciousness, his first discovery was that he was in a trap. He was caught between his instinct drives and a not too accommodating external world. The problem of politics is essentially this. Shall man, carried away by a conviction of his own progress, but secretly driven by unmastered emotions, continue to spin round in his trap like a squirrel in a cage, or can he find some way out of the cage? Up to the present our political leaders have done little more than accelerate or retard the spinning, and have thereby forfeited our confidence. The elector of the future can at least take this comfort to heart. He may do better than his forerunners: he cannot possibly do worse.

VI

EDUCATION OR CULTURE TRANSMISSION ?

I HAVE said that man, through no fault of his own, is caught in a trap. He is charged with instincts, the driving force of which has never been calculated. On the other hand, he lives in a world which not only does little to satisfy his instincts, but appears to threaten him at all points. Even if he should succeed in establishing material security and comfort, his position is still precarious. For he lives on a narrow and constantly diminishing margin of companionships—a few loved ones, a small circle of friends, a haphazard assortment of casual acquaintances—and for the rest possibly a domestic pet, a cocker spaniel, a cat, a canary. Yet unless he goes mad he can neither escape this oppressive external world nor take to flight from his own insatiable instincts. So he adopts all sorts of expedients to comfort himself. He may plunge into work or, if his means permit, into pleasure; he may take to drink or mortify the flesh; he may dull his imagination or sink into a stupor of phantasy and illusion; he may become ill or take to crime. Not that these expedients are necessarily bad. So long as they work, no professional person has any right to interfere. The fact is, however, that on the balance they do

not work very well. The neurotic illnesses and unhappiness of individual man, together with the miseries of the group in times of war or depression, are sufficient to show that, behind the most solid of exteriors, man's control of instinct is fundamentally unstable.

Can We Control Our Own Destinies?

But if it is instinct that makes a treadmill of life, we cannot hope to escape from this treadmill unless we have a thorough understanding of the processes which control instinct. There can be no hope of solving human problems unless we can manage to capture and exploit the machinery of mind. For the fact is that we have at present little control of this machinery. We are occasionally capable of some degree of reasoned judgment, but practically never give effect to this judgment unless it bears the sign-manual of the unconscious. The expedients we employ to fortify ourselves against hardship are not within our conscious control. We employ them, but we know not how or why. Our problem can now be stated quite simply: Can we reverse this state of affairs? Can we take a hand in controlling our own destinies?

I think you will agree with me that the question is not one which admits of a ready answer. And yet, vast as the issues are, it is possible to indicate in which direction the answer must lie. All we need

is a simple enough approach. For example, if we take the view that man is in a sense a carrier of instinct, that his first concern is the gratification or alternatively the control of instinct, we can envisage our problem more easily. Man's conflicts are then seen to be clashes of instinct with reality. Solution of his conflicts must lie in preventing or alleviating instinct-tension. Either we can secure more effective gratification of instinct or we can secure more effective control. We must either mould the world to our needs or modify our needs. If it should prove essential to modify our needs this can be done in one of two ways. Either we modify them within our own minds or we secure their modification through external influences.

The Influence of Suggestion

I am afraid all this may sound very dry and technical, in which case I suggest that we study one or two examples of these internal and external influences. Take, for instance, the case of a general election. Studying the reactions of various electors we soon discover that although man can be pig-headed to a degree he is also extremely amenable to influence. Leaders are quick to take advantage of these facts and the average general election soon degenerates into a battle between suggestionists for the right to cozen the electors. It is interesting to study the main types of suggestion used. They fall

naturally into two groups. The leader may try to create the impression of being a beneficent father and thereby exploit the filial suggestibility of the elector. Or he may appeal to negative suggestion by painting his political enemies black. The picture of Mr. Baldwin as a solid country squire full of love for England and her cottage homes, imbued with the spirit of reasonableness and yet firm in the defence of the liberties of the subject, is clearly of the first type. Mr. Baldwin saving the country from the perils of Socialism belongs to the second group. In the one case the appeal is to love: in the other to fear. In one case Mr. Baldwin is the father: in the other, incongruous as it may appear, he is the son. In either case the effect is enhanced by the processes of myth formation. The fairy tales of politics are almost exact repetitions of the fairy tales of childhood, a fact which most caricaturists have grasped. St. George in Broadcloth slaying the Socialist dragon may be a little more drab than his forerunners of the nursery but he has the same appeal. The only risk is that a cynical opponent may effect a counter-stroke. He may suggest that so far from being St. George, Mr. Baldwin is only the Old Woman who lived in a Shoe. On the virtue of these suggestions and counter-suggestions may hang the political destinies of a nation.

The point of all this is that by the use of these devices the attention of the elector is diverted from

his own immediate needs. And he responds either by identifying with the ideal that is dangled before him or by rejecting it. This is only another way of saying that the instincts of man can to a certain extent be sidetracked by the processes of suggestion. It is of course a witting attempt to modify man's unconscious mechanisms. The political suggestionist does not know how his suggestions work or in which way his patient will react, but he has certain rule-of-thumb methods and he uses them deliberately. Even if the results are sometimes disconcerting, they are as a rule impressive. There are occasions, however, when men attempt to control the unconscious mind without having the slightest idea that they are attempting anything in particular. To make this point clear, I must first of all tell you something about an unconscious mental mechanism which goes by the name of displacement.

Escape through Displacement

Displacement is an unconscious transfer of instinct energy from its original object to a new object. It brings about a transfer to that new object of emotional interests and attitudes that were once appropriate to the old object. Thus the unsatisfied love of a little child for its mother can, in course of time, be displaced to a schoolmistress, the Queen, the Mother Country, the stratosphere, the Milky Way, the mathematical infinite or the philosophic abso-

lute. Or again, the unsatisfied hate of an aggressive little English boy can later become hate of some English political leader or of some foreign dictator, Hitler or Mussolini, for example. The trouble is that if he should happen to be an aggressive little Italian boy he is more likely to hate the Emperor of Abyssinia or Mr. Anthony Eden. The more provocatively Mr. Eden behaves towards Italy, the more certain he is of diverting Italian hate from Abyssinia to England. Elementary observations no doubt, but unfortunately of some consequence in international affairs. The primitive origin of these displacements is occasionally uncovered in modern society. It is traditionally supposed that the heart of an English duchess goes all of a flutter at the sight of a bunch of primroses. Radicals wearing red ties used to poke fun at the idea. Anthropologists might have pointed out that the primrose was a totem flower, that like all totems it represents ultimately the body of an ancestral object, in this case the body of Disraeli. But it was left to the Russian Communist to give away the secret of such displacements by embalming the body of his leader, so that in this immortal state he might be worshipped by the faithful in the Red Square of Moscow. Now, curiously enough, although Communists have officially excommunicated psychology, they are the one political party which has made vigorous but unwitting attempts to modify unconscious psycho-

logical mechanisms. The success or failure of Communist efforts to establish the Proletarian State depends on whether it is possible to transfer a surplus of unconscious family love from short-distance displacements, such as the cinema stars, kings, queens and countries, to the concept of the State or the Communist International. All we know at the moment is that short-distance displacements are stronger and more enduring than long-distance displacements. Blood is thicker than water. Love of the Mother Country is more enduring than an infatuation for the stratosphere. It is also more common. Nevertheless the Russian experiment is a fascinating one partly because it is so gigantic. Naturally we cannot predict the result so long as the Communist holds a revolver to the temples of those who disagree with him. The psychologists of next century or the century after may be able to record it. In the meantime, one can only advise Communists to look out for the equally unconscious family hate which follows so closely on the heels of displaced family love. So long as they can deflect this hatred on to enemies within the gate or capitalist enemies without, nothing is likely to disturb their plans. When they no longer have enemies to blame or persecute, their stability will be put to the hazard.

You will gather from all this that very little experimental work has been done on the displacement of instinct. Apart from the pious hopes of

schoolmasters that gymnastic exercises will deflect the sexual impulses of adolescents and the equally pious hopes of pacifists that football matches will evaporate war fears, no one troubles to go into this matter scientifically. In any case, displacement is only one of about a dozen equally powerful and equally unconscious mechanisms; and, to judge from the experience of psycho-analysts, the others are much more difficult to handle. At any rate it takes long enough to modify them in the individual even under the most favourable circumstances: that is to say, when the individual is ill. It is true that in recent years a great deal of energy has been devoted by analysts to the problem of altering the character of individuals as distinct from altering their symptoms. In addition analysts are now becoming sufficiently sure of their general formulations to offer some advice as to the actual upbringing of man. No doubt when analytical services are as widely distributed as existing public health services to say nothing of preventive clinics for school children, a more vital psychological contribution to the problem will be made. In the meantime I shall not exasperate you by suggesting that psycho-analysis of the race is the cure for all ills. The only analytic conclusion I wish to advance at the moment is that whatever means we adopt to modify unconscious mechanisms must be at least a little more powerful than the mechanisms we try to supersede.

The Inhibiting Forces of Education

Our next step is obvious. There is one great environmental thrust against the instincts of man which has not been fully explored. We must consider the possibilities of education. Now the first thing to realize about education is that our dictionaries lead us astray. They usually tell us that it is a process of drawing out the capacities of the individual, a form of mental and moral cultivation. Now even if this view is applicable to adult man, we must face the fact that it is difficult to teach an old dog new tricks. Man, the adult, is about as ductile as the brontosaurus. If human beings are to be educated to any purpose, the education must start in the nursery. And it is just in the nursery that we find how far our dictionaries have led us astray. We find there that one of the main aims of education is to 'thrust back,' to inhibit and sometimes to smash the capacities of the individual. It is a powerful drive directed by the older generation against the instincts of the young.

From the moment of birth, the infant is surrounded by influential figures who make it their business to inhibit, check, reprove and punish, and by the time he has reached the age of formal school education, the child has been treated for some years as if he were a dangerous enemy rather than the offspring of parental love. He is sub-

jected to an interminable series of 'don'ts' and 'mustn'ts'; the standard of behaviour he has to live up to are infinitely more severe than those his parents apply to their own behaviour. He mustn't be angry, complain or be rude; he must be reasonable, intelligent, patient, polite, clean, tidy, unselfish. He has inflicted on him rituals of behaviour and timetables which would provoke a riot in any of His Majesty's prisons. And above all, he is forbidden to enjoy himself. The story is told of the father of Sir Walter Scott, by no means an unkind parent, that, discovering his son was one of those rare children who really enjoy porridge, he threw a handful of salt into the plate, presumably to correct his perspective. No doubt the tale is apocryphal, but it illustrates a common attitude. It is recorded of a Victorian mother that she would give her children nothing to eat unless they were seated at table before the bell rang. And you are all familiar with some of these moral disciplines: no cake before bread, early to bed, no lights after bedtime, combing curls out of naturally curly hair, untrimming new hats, punishing a whole family or class for the fault of one, or insisting that pocket-money should be put in a savings bank, to choose a few examples at random. 'But,' I can almost hear you saying, 'those were the bad old times. We are more enlightened nowadays.' But are we? I can only say that there is no evidence

of it, indeed much to the contrary. Modern child education has fallen under two pernicious influences, the hygienic obsessions of the doctor and the pseudo-scientific morality of half-baked psychologists. So that some parents are led to believe they have discharged their functions when they plant a tin of 'Glucose D' on the nursery breakfast table, and others feel up to date, that is to say virtuous, when they have reduced the lives of their children to misery by following so-called psychological rules which are little short of cruelty to animals.

Take the very simplest example: the view that has gained currency in recent years, that it is wrong to lift up a baby when it cries; it will develop bad habits, become spoilt and come to a bad end. It is easy to show that this pharisaical attitude to the unfortunate is particularly inconsistent not to say brutal. Imagine what would happen if this principle were adopted by the St. John Ambulance Corps. Suppose that the ambulance man, instead of stopping to render first aid to a motor accident on the Kingston by-pass, either averted his head and accelerated the ambulance, or that, becoming suddenly indignant, he dismounted and delivered a curtain lecture to the casualty on the wrongness of groaning aloud. Indeed, there are some who maintain that although the mediaeval parent was more brutal physically to his children than present-day parents, still, by virtue of the amount of neglect his children en-

joyed, he was, without knowing it, infinitely kinder mentally. He left them alone. I believe myself that by about the 1960's the reaction of our present-day children to the Georgian era will be charged with a hostility compared with which the contempt of the Edwardian for the Victorian Age will appear a form of filial piety. And I think the verdict will be justified.

Driving Out the Devil

Now it is quite true that these physiological and pseudo-psychological obsessions have not yet percolated to any serious extent to the formal school education of this country. In this respect, our State and public schools may congratulate themselves on being behind the times. Nevertheless, judged solely on their spontaneous policies, our schools can be seen to maintain in a more disguised way the traditions of the nursery. The systems of punishment or moral disapproval, the insistence on various forms of ritual, the emphasis placed on the learning of non-essentials, together with the open or secret taboos placed on most natural expressions of instinct, bear such a remarkable resemblance to infantile education that we are bound to inquire what central principles are common to both.

In the first place, it is clear that either consciously or unconsciously education is intended to strike at all derivatives of primitive sexual and aggressive impulse, including here a large part of the impulses

of curiosity. These inhibitive policies have become more active since it became the fashion for parents to take an active interest in the rearing of their children. Acting on the inaccurate information of so-called experts in child guidance they have felt justified in interfering with almost every spontaneous expression of these impulses. In earlier times the myth of the 'innocent baby' saved many infants from this interference, but since it can no longer be denied that the infant exhibits quite plainly a number of primitive sexual strivings it is possible for the older generation to direct their inhibiting tendencies with more skill. The same is true of aggressive impulses. Parents who permit themselves every form of egoistic indulgence will allow the full weight of their moral disapproval to fall on the mildest egocentricities of their unfortunate children. Small wonder then that schoolmasters following in the footsteps of the parents so frequently dull the intelligence of those bright and inquisitive mortals who are handed over to their care. This is the more formal way of stating the situation. But it does too much credit to the foresight of the educator. It does not bring out the fact that the reason we drive against these impulses in children is not simply out of social expediency. The real reason is a superstitious one. We actually do behave towards children as if they were possessed of the devil, and as if it were our duty to drive this devil out.

You may recall during the broadcast on crime I explained that the attitude of society to crime is essentially animistic. We behave as if we must drive the devil out of the criminal. The physicians of earlier days treated many bodily illnesses in the same way. They believed in driving out the vapours. And to the present day most of us are afraid to cut short a common cold lest we should 'drive the badness in.' The pastors of New England exhorted the Evil One to issue forth from the bodies of those who had fallen under the spell of witches. They fought battles with witches, and, ecclesiastical history records, were sometimes overcome. The practice of flogging lunatics was justified on the same animistic grounds. The evidence is unfortunately only too strong that our educational institutions constitute one of the sanctuaries of superstition and animistic belief. Indeed they go farther than many of our animistic forefathers. We attack children not solely because they are possessed of their own devils but because we believe they are possessed of ours, and not only ours, but, fantastic as it may seem, those of our ancestors.

Acid Test of Civilization

This superstitious attitude explains much that is incomprehensible in education, in particular, the peculiar habit of inflicting on children and adolescents an enormous amount of useless knowledge

and subsequently putting them through an interminable series of examinations, obviously a test of mental endurance. This endurance factor is the key to the mystery. Education, being based to a considerable extent on savage belief, gives expression to savage ritual. Examination systems are essentially initiation rites, forms of puberty ordeal such as are followed universally by savage tribes. The difference is mainly the difference between a physical and a mental test. Admittedly the English adolescent is not pounced on by a bearded black fellow, who proceeds to knock out some of his front teeth with a wedge and hammer, but he is liable to be grilled by a rather bored university professor with some of the refined remorselessness which prolonged residence in a cultural institution tends to induce.

The discovery that the policies of education are shaped by animistic reactions, throws a new light on human affairs. For one thing, it enables us to formulate the ultimate test of any civilization. The acid test of a civilization is its attitude to children. Not merely because the child holds in its hands the key to all future civilization, but because from our attitude to children we can gather what our real attitude is to our own unconscious instinct life. If we fear or hate children, we fear and hate our unconscious. And if we fear or hate our unconscious, we will never be able to add to the liberties of man. The problem of man's freedom is not solved by the

vote by ballot, it is not solved by freedom of speech or Press, it is not solved by worship of democracy. Freedom of speech, when it does exist, is certainly the breath of life, but the vote by ballot is a confession of fear, and the worship of democracy an idealization to be judged by its results. Freedom no doubt is a very relative term, but even so, we cannot hope to be relatively free so long as we are afraid of ourselves. The first step in working for freedom is clear. We must extend freedom to our children.

After all, think what are actually the problems of mankind. What is war but an outbreak of primitive defences against our own fear and hate? What is compulsive crime but fear masquerading as rebellion? Why does the world, or any one country, periodically fall into states of depression? Because owing to fear we cannot use our brains. What are unhappiness and mental ill-health but the clash of primitive guilts with current modes of satisfying instinct? How can we hope to break any of these vicious circles so long as wittingly or unwittingly we drive our children sheeplike into the same pens? Here is the real issue of human politics. Can we transmit culture to our children without stultifying all our efforts by playing on their unconscious fears and guilts? Can we reduce the regrettable tendency of small human beings to inflate their natural anxieties on the slightest provocation? Can we

refrain from provoking in them terrors which lead, in their turn, to immeasurable irrationality?

A Neglected Experiment in Human Relations

So far we have not attempted to answer these questions in the only way that scientific questions can be answered, by mobilizing all our information on the subject and applying those conclusions which are well founded. For although I have not concealed my view that parents, schoolmasters, family doctors and child-guidance pundits may make every psychological mistake under the sun, I do not believe that this state of affairs is irremediable. If that were the case then obviously the less said the better. Apart from venting one's own spleen, there is nothing to be gained by carping at old-established institutions if it is impossible to modify them. There is always something to be said for old-established institutions. Man may be irrational most of the time but he is not irrational all the time. The mistake is to assume that because an institution is old-established it is wholly good and ought not to be changed. The ultimate treachery to civilization is to make the admitted virtues of any system an excuse for indulging its vices.

The main obstacles to a humane attitude in education are fear, guilt and a compulsion to reform or punish others. If we can modify these reactions it is reasonably certain that the natural friendliness

of mankind will assert itself to more purpose. Although he is amongst the most fearful and intractable of animals, man, like all mammals, has a capacity for friendly feeling. Provided they are not intimidated parents can be counted on to display a reasonable amount of good-will towards their children. We must see to it then that they are not intimidated, that the anxieties which lead to every sort of excess are lightened. Even a marginal alleviation might be sufficient to produce a radical alteration in attitude. Guilt and the compulsion to reform are more difficult problems to tackle. The situation is after all a tempting one. It is such an easy matter to conceal one's own deficiencies from oneself by recognizing them in a child; and then to justify a sadistic urge to 'reform' children on the specious assumption that it is all for the child's own good. Even so a great deal might be done to counter these tendencies by supplying accurate information. But that information must not be tainted by the moral prejudices of the adviser. I almost hesitate to express these views so strongly, lest by so doing I should induce in you a reaction of pessimism or hopelessness. You may feel that I am setting up ideals that are impossible for the ordinary parent to attain. Parents, you may argue, are after all human beings. They may not want children, they may hate them, they may find them a bore, a nuisance or a burden. No doubt that is frequently

the case. So far from ignoring these factors psychoanalysts were the first to offer a reasonable explanation of them. The more frequently they occur the more urgent it becomes to lessen their influence by reducing the parents' irrational anxiety. A decent hate adequately measured has already lost much of its power to injure. It is less liable to cause panic; and it can no longer masquerade as solicitude.

Here is a gigantic experiment in human relations. We may not be able to say that success is certain. Man's instinctual inheritance may be too strong for us. We may produce the same crop of irrational fears whatever we do. But at least, if we can be brought to behave in a more humane and rational way to our children, we can be certain of increasing the happiness of future generations. In any case we have nothing to lose. I have no great faith in the virtue of slogans. Their success, such as it is, depends too much on the forces of superstition. Nevertheless, confronted as man is by irrational responses to apparently insoluble problems, it is tempting to echo a political cry which has been current in Europe during the century. Translated into psychological terms it runs: 'Let the reasonable people of the world unite, they have nothing to lose but their fears.'

VII

A THOUSAND YEARS ON

DURING these discussions I have drawn heavily on your indulgence. I have put forward views which I am well aware must have sounded far-fetched to many of you. I have said that man, the individual, is for the most part an irrational creature, his mind governed by mechanisms which are to a large extent a protection against unreasoning fear. I have maintained that civilized groups do not differ widely from savage groups; and that the reactions produced in them are also in the main a response to fear. Crime is a response to unconscious fear: war is a response to unconscious fear. I am also aware that of all the ideas I have put before you, these concepts of unconscious fear, anxiety or guilt must have aroused your particular scepticism. You are ready to agree that at times you are consciously afraid: but that fears can exist in your mind of which you are quite unaware must appear inherently improbable. Some unfortunate individuals who suffer from what we call 'anxiety readiness,' and are liable to develop panic on the slightest excuse, may perhaps believe in the existence of unconscious fear. But to most the evidence must appear inconclusive. The fact is that when unconscious anxieties

appear in consciousness they are not necessarily experienced in the direct form of anxiety. For example, the so-called greedy child is not really greedy: it is unconsciously anxious. The inferior person is not really inferior: he is unconsciously guilty. The mentally sick person, though sick enough in all conscience, is really suffering from an excess of unconscious anxiety and guilt. I cannot hope to make this matter more convincing in the space at my disposal. I can only remind you that invisibility is no proof of non-existence. Unconscious forces, like the forces of electricity, can only be demonstrated through the effects they produce. On the other hand, although I have suggested that most of our irrational fears and behaviour are due to the operation of primitive unconscious mechanisms, I have been careful to add that so far we are unable to dispense with them. Most of our civilized activities depend on these same mechanisms.

This, you may say, is all very well, possibly even true. But if it is true what are we to do about it? You will no doubt remember I have said there is really very little to be done for adult man except make him as comfortable as possible. I did say, however, that if we treated our children with more humanity, if we succeeded in reducing their vast charges of irrational fear, we might in time produce a generation capable of solving, with comparative ease, the problems which at present seem to baffle man's ingenuity. But I do not believe for a moment

that these broad generalizations will satisfy you. You will no doubt suspect me of trying to fob you off with pious opinions. You may even accuse me of being that most tiresome of creatures, the Utopia-monger, who compensates for an absence of practical ideas by producing windy speculations about the future.

Utopias of Succeeding Generations

Now, by customary definition, a Utopia is an imaginary world enjoying perfection in every aspect of its organization. Yet it is to be noted that every generation produces its own characteristic Utopia. It is clear that our standards alter from time to time. Some of you may perhaps remember the Victorian Utopias in which the waters of the Thames were represented as fragrant and clear, or in which curiously gentle mortals, clad in remarkable garments of a hygienic pattern, conducted tepid conversations in an elevating tone of voice: or danced morris-dances in the best arts and crafts manner. It is true the Utopias of this century are made of sterner stuff. Scientific imaginations have been harnessed to the task of describing a more and more complicated material world. But however this organization is attained, whether by the efforts of heroic aviators or by the passage of simpler mortals through a purgatory of disaster, we come to the same idea in the end, that mankind will attain a state of comparative, if not complete, happiness.

I think it is well to familiarize ourselves with the needs which stimulate this interest in the Golden Age. This can best be done by describing some Utopias which have not yet been submitted by their authors for publication. Those of you who have opportunities of watching a new-born baby in its sleep can sometimes observe that when it is disturbed by a strong light its face will pucker up, but that after a few seconds its mouth will begin to make rather voluptuous sucking movements, and then with a sigh the baby will sink back into profound sleep. This is man's first unwritten Utopia. Psycho-analysts believe that the baby has not only dealt with a painful stimulus by the repetition of pleasure movements, but that inside its rather simple mind it has recaptured the pleasure memory of the act of suckling. The observer knows of course that no such act has taken place. The whole thing is an hallucination, but as long as the baby is not too hungry it works. In other words, the Utopia of a small infant is a world of milk and peppermint water, in which the pangs of hunger or colic are no sooner felt than they are assuaged.

I need not remind you that these dream activities can be observed in a modified form in the fairy tales told by children of all ages, in which the hero lives happily ever after, or in the thousand-and-one myths with which men of all ages have attempted to soften the asperities of life. More interesting to us than these

familiar products of the human imagination are the world systems and philosophies of life evolved by some of the insane. Unfortunate mortals who have apparently lost all touch with real events are capable of producing remarkable, if somewhat grotesque, schemes of world organization illustrated by curious diagrams possibly drawn on jam-pot covers. The essential difference between these schemes and the writings of an H. G. Wells is simply that the author knows his ideas to be fanciful whilst the insane person believes them to be true. In addition the sane Utopist wants to alter the world for others as well as for himself: the new world of the insane Utopist is for himself alone.

Our Stone Age Mentality

Now, whereas the Utopias of the insane consist almost solely of what their authors want to happen, the professional Utopist modifies these wishes in accordance with what he thinks might possibly happen. A third step is necessary in building up Utopias: to establish what must inevitably happen. You may have noticed that whilst the world depicted in a modern Utopia is full of strange buildings, marvellous inventions and every imaginable kind of secret ray, the people who inhabit it are not very different from ourselves. They are credited with an imposing list of noble qualities, yet their talk is rather undistinguished and their sentiments some-

what tedious. In other words, the author can think out improvements in man's physical capacities, but he is unable to imagine any improvements in his mind. The most elaborate means of Utopian locomotion are, after all, merely extensions of the legs. When we can all afford to travel at four hundred miles an hour in the stratosphere, we have certainly given some reality to the child's tale of the Seven League Boots, but having arrived at our destination with this remarkable speed, we are left to our own mental resources, and our mental resources are little different from those we possessed in the Stone Age. We can invent new eyes for ourselves, but when our television has ranged the universe it rests at last on the faces of our next-door neighbours, a not very exhilarating prospect which our grandfathers defended themselves against by cultivating privet hedges. Instead of growing ears as large as elephants' we have developed wireless receivers, but the sounds we hear are, as you have no doubt realized by now, the sounds of ordinary mortals in travail. However we develop the artificial instruments of man, the mind of man remains the same. If his mind is irrational, he will use his new instruments irrationally. When modern man makes war he certainly does so with a vengeance, using all the increased powers which science has developed for him. But he still goes to war!

The first conclusion a psycho-analyst would lay

down about life a thousand years hence is that in most essential respects it will be just the same as the life we lead now. Unless we can do something to break the vicious circle of irrational fear, we have no reason whatever to suppose that we shall alter very much. No doubt in some external respects life then will appear to be different from life to-day, in the same way that life to-day appears to be different from life in Saxon times. We may be able to cater more efficiently for the self-preservative needs of man, but estimated in terms of human relations, which is, after all, a fundamental test, there will be no difference. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the first spontaneous thrust of human civilization has expended itself. We continue to produce changes, but we have now got to the point where the more a thing changes the more it remains unchanged, and our civilization will continue to go round and round in circles until some new impetus is developed.

Baby—the Common Denominator

You will naturally ask why one can be so positive on this point. And the answer is: because the babies of all races and civilizations behave in very much the same way for the first few years of life. The infantile mechanisms which direct life and the infantile emotional patterns which give it its characteristic appearance have the same spontaneous form

in all races. And since for the moment these cannot be voluntarily controlled, we have no means of initiating deep changes. Not only are most unconscious mechanisms beyond our control, but even these few mechanisms with which we can experiment do not allow us very much latitude. Whether internationalism can ever be established depends entirely on whether we can displace unconscious family emotions to that more remote ideal. But family feeling is like an elastic band on the stretch: it is constantly pulling back. If, after an interminable series of wars, internationalism is ever established, the next series of wars will be fought by those whose faith has turned back to a new ideal of nationalism. In short, however remarkable the buildings of the future may be, they still will be built to house families. And the love and hate which make and break families will remain as before. Even if we try to obliterate this family feeling by bringing up our babies in incubators, we cannot prevent the baby constituting his family circle. For although legally it is the family that makes the baby, psychologically it is the baby that makes the family. It is the one fixed and unalterable point in all world organization.

Now this view that the civilization of a thousand years hence will not differ very much from our own is based on the assumption that we do nothing to alter the fundamental mechanisms of mind. But

suppose that by eliminating irrational fears we gave a fresh impetus to adaptation, what would the world look like then? In the first place a civilization which has freed itself from irrational fear will naturally make a point of maintaining all those institutions which have brought about the elimination of fear. This is only common sense. Let us assume then that the only chance of reducing adult fear is to diminish the fears of children. Suppose further that our only chance of relieving infantile fears is to behave in a more Christian manner to children. Where do these suppositions lead us?

One outstanding fact in our age of specialization is the tendency to delegate the upbringing of children, to let it pass out of the hands of the immediate family. This is true of both rich and poor, although for different reasons. In a psycho-analytic Utopia we must assume that this dangerous and deplorable tendency is corrected. As I have tried to suggest in an earlier broadcast, unless it is positively bad for the child, mothers will look after their own children for the first four to five years. This will mean that if every woman who wants children can have, let us say, a family of three, there will be no place for them in industry for roughly ten years. And during the same period it will be desirable for the father of the family to take a greater share in family life than is possible at present. This means that his working day need not exceed five hours at

the very most, so that if desirable he can eat, rest or play at home. Not, by the way, that the child should be hedged in by a nervous circle of amateur family psychologists. No more horrifying prospect could be imagined. On the contrary the aim of all such arrangements would be to provide an environmental setting for the child as free as possible from harassing anxieties. By this means there will be some chance of reducing the sadistic influences brought to bear on the child; in short, of making child rearing what it ought to be—the oldest, most honoured and most skilled of human professions.

Ways and Means

Those of you who have been carried away by the political ideals of prudent Chancellors of the Exchequer with their not unreasonable views on the necessity of balancing the budget, may be inclined at this point to hold up your hands in horror. At the least you may wonder how the community can possibly support these extravagances. I would remind you, however, that in the considered opinion of many economists, the standard of living of all communities can be raised enormously, and the leisure of workers greatly increased, if only problems of economic organization could be approached in a reasonable frame of mind. And it is interesting to note that the common accusation made by one political party or class against its opponents is to

the effect that they are greedy, selfish and childishly concerned with their own interests. In a sense of course all these accusations are true. All political parties tend to be greedy and selfish, but for just the same reason that children are sometimes called greedy and selfish, namely, that they are over-anxious. Political parties are over-anxious and their anxieties infect the imaginations of their leaders. The result is that it is exceptional to find any political leader who can see beyond his own nose. A reduction in this anxiety would automatically bring about a huge increase in the effective resources of nations. For this reason alone it should be the first concern of responsible politicians not only to free themselves from fear but to reduce the irresponsible fears of the economic hierarchy.

Freedom of Choice in Education

Another step in the same direction is to break up mass-education for small children. If there are still city streets in Utopia, then every fourth house in those streets will be a school for children between the ages of four and seven, with a maximum of ten children and staff of four, of whom two will themselves be children about the age of puberty. For Utopia will involve the restoration of child labour to a place of dignity in social life. I need hardly add that these schools will not be prisons and that they will not be compulsory. Specialism will natu-

rally still have its place in education, but for children from seven to puberty the central school will be reduced to the status of a half-time institution. Small special schools of all sorts will be everywhere, just as shops are everywhere at present. Children will be able to pick up their education with the same freedom that good housekeepers go marketing. They will be taught to play and learn just as present-day adults do, that is to say, in their way and in their own time. At puberty education can with safety become centralized and systematized—for the emancipated adolescent will learn what is necessary with rapidity.

The True Obscurantist

I have chosen these examples to indicate that a Utopia should be built up in a systematic way starting with the simplest and most fundamental conceptions which govern, or should govern, the organization of groups. You see that following the most elementary conceptions of baby rearing and child education we are compelled to visualize a complete revolution in social organization. The opposition to this revolution would not come solely from political quarters and it would increase with every step. Obviously the next step would be to consider what head of population would be most suitable to the advancement of these social ideals. But to put the matter simply in terms of head of

population would be to ignore the existence of the most violent emotional prejudices existing in all communities. We cannot talk of population without involving ourselves in such controversial issues as marriage, divorce, legitimacy, birth control, adoption of children, laws of inheritance, social equality of the sexes, to say nothing of infanticide, care for the old and euthanasia. And no doubt before we could take a single step towards discussing such problems we would be surrounded by an excited group of propagandists all pressing for the acceptance of their official creeds. Considerations of time and emotional expediency prevent any further reference to these matters here. I might add two comments which appear to me to be pertinent. Issues such as birth control can never be dealt with objectively so long as people have the most violent unconscious bias on the subjects of infanticide, parricide or euthanasia for the old and infirm. Although savage customs regulating these problems are usually repugnant to the European conscience, there is no doubt that the unconscious mind of the European is just as concerned with them. Just because of these unconscious difficulties, that part of the science of eugenics which deals with human inheritance has remained at a superstitious level. Human eugenics offer the widest scope to our unconscious sadism. And long before a Utopian state of society is reached it will have fallen into the

disrepute which most pseudo-sciences merit. It is indeed curious how far we have been led astray by economic battle-cries. We have almost come to believe that a reactionary is a political animal. On the contrary, there is only one obscurantist worthy of serious attention, the moral reformer masquerading as scientist.

The Factor of Human Conservatism

I have discussed two only of a number of simple suggestions. But already you will observe that this train of thought almost assumes the existence of cities. But will cities exist? That appears to be rather a key problem, although actually the psychologist is not very much concerned one way or the other. Inevitably in the next five hundred years there will be a fight over industrialism. At present all political parties, however much they may differ as to its organization, are committed to industrialism of some sort. No doubt in course of time this system will be challenged, and the first nation to do so will be at war with the world. But whatever the outcome, it is perfectly evident that the deepest and most conservative drives towards family organization will not be altered. They have not weakened since prehistoric times. And not only are they reinforced amongst civilized peoples by unconscious taboos on blood intermarriage, but they are periodically exploited even by the most sophis-

ticated races. I have said that our mental resources and attitudes have not changed much since the Stone Age: and possibly you may have thought my Utopian system of education appropriate only for a tribal village in the South Seas. Yet I maintain quite seriously that, given the opportunity, most people would like to spend at least a quarter of their waking lives under Stone Age conditions. If you have any doubt on this point, I can only recommend a walking tour along the south coast of England in summertime. Allowing for such differences as the use of motor transport, the lives of English shore-dwelling tribes is seen to be of the most primitive pattern. The tent, the caravan, the dixie tin, sun-bathing, simple sports, the emotional hugger-mugger that exists when children and parents sprawl in temporary equality on a warm and wet foreshore. All this was no doubt the Utopia of Neolithic Man. The essential difference between the Stone Age and the modern English seaside is that motor-boats have now taken the place of war canoes. The summer inhabitants of East Wittering do not make raids on the shores of West Wittering to bring home some choice prisoners for the cooking-pot. Cannibalism is no longer a conscious temptation in England, although we may still observe vestiges of primeval hostility in the social contempt with which the inhabitants of Hove treat the more gregarious crowds of Brighton.

I mention these considerations to remind you that the usual Utopian idea of a more and more complicated world is not so self-evident as it may appear. Man is always so close to his primitive origins that he can never really escape far from them. However elaborate his ideal world he must not lose sight of those simpler needs which can never be permanently neglected. But when all is said the psychological Utopist is really not vitally concerned with the externals of the world. Assuming that man has the courage to arrange his economic system in order to satisfy self-preservative needs it doesn't really matter very much what the external world is like in other respects. We have no evidence that multi-millionaires are any happier or more free from irrational fear than the impoverished; although this fact does not justify our neglect of the problem of poverty; in short the Utopia of the psychologist is essentially a mental Utopia—not, of course, mental perfection but mental adequacy. But it is difficult to be adequate so long as we live on the verge of panic. Granted that man can so bring up the new generation that their burdens of fear are reduced, there is no reason to suppose that his main difficulties will not diminish correspondingly. We may in a thousand years' time solve the problems of war, of crime, and of mental ill health and unhappiness. Our jealousies will diminish, our sexual antagonisms subside and the battle between the generations die

away. Above all an enormous amount of mental energy, which is at present locked up in the form of defences against our own instincts, will be freed for the task of promoting human adaptation or initiating a fresh thrust in civilization.

The Practice of Religion in Utopia

In case you should suspect me of being a reformer in psycho-analytical clothing I am constrained to add here a few precautionary comments. The impulse to reform has been a constant source of irritation to man since civilization got into its first swing. Obviously there is some danger that the Utopist may also be a reformer, equally that the reformer may be a Utopist. The fact is, however, that you cannot be a very good Utopist if you are driven by an itch to reform. Although I have said that the simplest way of reducing irrational fear in man is through his behaviour to his own children, I would not have you think that I am out to reform either parents or children. That would be the final guarantee of failure. The problem is largely one of attitude rather than impulse. It is indeed remarkable how frequently the researches of psycho-analysts into the deepest recesses of the mind confirm the conjectures of some of the world's deepest religious thinkers. Psycho-analysts have pursued the problem of conscience beyond the

frontier of consciousness, and the further they go the nearer they come to the concept not only of original sin but of godlike perfection. In his introduction Dr. Inge expressed some regret that Freud had openly referred to religion as an illusion. And no doubt this raised a good deal of needless alarm in the minds of those who fear that psycho-analysis is subversive of all man's intuitive religious feeling. In actual fact no one has been more deeply understanding in his attitude to man's religious needs than Freud. Admittedly science has frequently come into open conflict with certain forms of religious belief. The nineteenth century battles of natural science with religious faith still echo in our minds. But Dr. Inge should not have confused the attitude of natural science with the attitude of psycho-analytic science. So far from being antagonistic to religion, psycho-analysis has done more to add vitality to religious principles than any official body in the world with the possible exception of the Salvation Army. Indeed, psycho-analysts are more logical in their application of principles than any cleric or reformer. The average religious-minded individual is inclined to be satisfied when he carries out his precepts in his relation to equals, that is to say to other adults. Psycho-analysts having made contact with the powerful reassuring and recuperating functions of Love in man's unconscious, have returned to everyday life with a renewed sense of

conviction. They find that religious institutions have not had the courage of their own convictions. They have neglected one of the most obvious outlets for their love-energies, the reduction of fear in the younger generation. In short, to the injunction 'Love thy neighbour as thyself,' the psycho-analyst has ventured to add 'Love thy children better than thyself.'

The Unending Quest

I have said that each generation has its characteristic Utopia: and I have tried to suggest that at every stage in his progress from the cradle to the grave, man continues to modify his Utopian demands. Starting with the utmost simplicity, these rise to a grandiose peak and gradually fade out into dreams of the past. At their best we call these visions of a promised land by the name of ideals: at their worst we label them the ravings of a monomaniac. And slowly but painfully we are beginning to learn that when even the most laudable of ideals departs too widely from the disciplines of reality thinking, it can be just as dangerous as the inflated ideas of the possessed. For despite his self-satisfaction the undisciplined idealist is a heavy liability, not an asset to society. Yet even if we would, we cannot dispense with these ideals. The task of civilization is to make our day-dreams correspond more closely with the capacities of man. Only in this way can

a Utopia come true. Of this at any rate we may be certain : however well the world may be organized a thousand years hence, there will still be men of emotional temper who, looking forward into the future, will conjure up fresh visions of the Millennium.

APPENDIX I

A NOTE ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SOME years before the Italo-Abyssinian dispute became an open danger to international relations I ventured to prophesy that the next important war would be started by pacifists. I did not mean of course that the pacifist could be saddled with sole responsibility, but that he would provide the proximate cause, the trigger impulse, for the next important outbreak. I found this roused considerable opposition in two quarters. Official pacifists of the type associated with the League of Nations Union naturally took exception to the view that their unconscious warlike drives were a potential source of danger to the community. And Socialist groups objected, partly for this reason, but in the main because their theories of war causation were economic in nature. War, they felt, was due solely and simply to the Capitalist organization of society, for example to the greed of privately owned armament firms. During the early phases of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis it became obvious that some of the most determined fire-eaters were to be found amongst the pacifist ranks. But it was equally obvious that they could uncover their warlike impulses only so long as they felt that had a good excuse. The excuse

of course was that since peace depended on the existence of the League of Nations it was necessary to defend this organization to the point of war. A few politicians here and there showed considerable uneasiness over this intransigence, and the general public, which without doubt included a large number of convinced pacifists, marked its disapproval of the whole manœuvre by not getting too excited. Despite the most active flogging of Radical and other pacifist newspapers even that most impressionable of groups, the London crowd, displayed little exuberance of feeling under one of the most trying conditions, namely, the display of war news and views in cinemas. During the 1935 election the man in the street remained lethargic in the face of determined attempts to stampede him through his ethical feelings.

This inertia was all the more remarkable when we consider that under ordinary circumstances the incitement of a 'righteous cause' is calculated to give point and impetus to the unconscious war-drives of any community. No doubt, in the psychological sense the time was not yet ripe for war. Many of the alarms and excursions following a major outbreak can be discounted for this reason. The drives of the immediate post-war generation are unconsciously satisfied by the recent outbreak or by any lesser wars which may occur in distant countries. Unconscious accumulation of fresh war-

impulse is not so likely to take effect until this generation has passed into a dangerous state of middle-agedness. Moreover the inertia on this occasion was no doubt increased by the fact that pacifist organizations had already shot their bolt in the Peace Ballot. In political affairs it is difficult within a short space of time to bring off the same trick twice.* Nevertheless the energies of pacifists remained unflagging. On the eve of the General Election some newspapers openly gloated over the prospect that the National Government's majority would be reduced on the ground that it would be more easy to bring pacifist pressure to bear on a reduced majority. In these circumstances it seems legitimate to add some comments on the real issue behind all this political strategy, the issue whether international affairs are to be conducted on a basis of objective reality or on the strength of emotional convictions whose source is extremely suspect.

Now since the League of Nations provides the latest excuse for warlike posturing, it is obviously in the public interest to inquire whether or not the League actually hinders the attainment of peace. Tackling this problem systematically we must consider the origin of the League, its ostensible aims and its actual working methods. Now it is quite true that the idea of an international peace organiza-

* See p. 102.

tion did not originate in the mind of President Wilson. Man has always been greatly intrigued by the notion of controlling the 'evil' impulses of all races through some world-wide ethical organization. This urge can be detected in his frequent efforts to found new churches. In any case he has so much trouble controlling his own unconscious impulses that it is a relief to think of a powerful organization controlling the impulses of others. It is a fact, however, that Wilson not only took to the idea with enthusiasm, but that he had unique opportunities of thrusting his own particular modification of it down the throats of unwilling and sceptical delegates to the Peace Congress. These delegates, incidentally, represented countries whose peace ideals at the time were influenced by three emotional reactions. They were enjoying relief from apprehension of defeat, they were celebrating victory and they were preparing first to punish and then to exploit the vanquished. It is generally agreed that these sequelae of victory are not ideal conditions in which to negotiate a peace settlement. It is not so generally agreed that a post-war Congress is the very worst place to enforce preconceived ideals. Owing to the strength of anti-war reactions pacifist schemes are liable to be adopted with undue haste. It does not follow that because they are pacifist schemes they are necessarily well adapted to peace conditions. Admittedly Wilson took advan-

tage of his opportunity. He was in a position to browbeat his less idealistically minded colleagues at the Congress. Evidently it was to his mind a question of now or never for the League idea. But the fact that the time appears ripe is no guarantee of the soundness of any plan. Even if his ideas had the authority of a divine revelation it would have been prudent to remember that the more he pressed his projects on unwilling nations the more likely these nations were to resort to sabotage in the future.

Take, for example, the ideal of open covenants openly arrived at with which Wilson hoped to counter what he regarded as the pernicious effects of secret diplomacy and treaties. At the time there were literally hosts of people who gave enthusiastic assent to this ideal without stopping for a moment to think whether it was either practicable or desirable. I have remarked elsewhere that although in recent times we appear to be in a great hurry to apply the ethical preconceptions of individuals to the sphere of international politics, we are much slower to apply to the same sphere some of the more realistic observations made on individual man. Just think what would happen if the arts of secret diplomacy were abandoned in the case of individual relations. Imagine a quarrel between husband and wife being thrashed out in the presence not only of the immediate family, but before all the family

relations and a few casual strangers hauled in from the streets. Consider the experience of those institutions where the practice exists of interviewing psychological cases in the presence of a number of students or post-graduates. It is well known that under such circumstances the patient either withholds the truth or prevaricates. But, you may say, in international affairs at least the final agreement must be published before it is ratified by the League, surely that is a safeguard. Theoretically no doubt it is, but for just the same reason it puts a premium on public lying. The fact is that diplomacy is a form of psychotherapy, and in most cases must be conducted in private. The real difficulty with international diplomacy is exactly the same as the difficulty with psychotherapy of the individual; the physician is often just as much in need of treatment as his patient.

The danger of idealistic preconceptions is perhaps better illustrated by the fact that Wilson's mind reached automatically to the idea of a World League. This seemed natural enough at the time. A so-called World War had just taken place, and in any case, as I have said, there is something appealing about the idea of an organization exercising world-wide control. At the present moment we are reaping the reward of this impracticality. Some time ago, in pursuance of the ideal of making the world safe for democracy, Abyssinia was admitted to the League

of Nations. The fact that by comparison with modern European standards Abyssinia's civilization stands little more than half-way between the civilization of head-hunters and the civilization of Europe in barbaric times was conveniently glossed over. And no doubt the League officials experienced some of that swelling self-satisfaction which arises when the Brotherhood of Man is publicly affirmed. Compare now this official League attitude with the attitude of many of its constituent members. Recall the behaviour of the Boers, the English, the Portuguese, of Belgians, French and Spanish to native races in Africa, to say nothing of the conduct of Germans when they had African colonies. Think of Australian reactions to blackfellows, of the Japanese attitude to the Koreans, of American behaviour to Negroes, of British reactions not only to the native population of India, but to the native tribes on the frontier. At the very moment when many English were talking of the 'poor Abyssinians' and 'horrid Italians' our newspapers reported an ambush on the Indian Frontier, part of the routine of punitive or pacification expeditions carried out by the British army of occupation.

It is not simply a question of certain European, American and Asiatic races pursuing a policy of physical domination over 'inferior' races. In all other important respects the barrier is complete. Not only are the subject races employed for the

most menial tasks of self-preservation, but the most stringent laws of sexual discrimination are applied to them. There is as little hope of an English Cabinet Minister affiancing his daughter to an Abyssinian native as there is of an American Senator allowing his daughter to marry a Negro. Indeed it is not unusual to find that in a country where black citizens are lynched for sexual offences against whites, the most idealistic pronouncements may be made on the subject of universal brotherhood. All very regrettable no doubt, but nevertheless facts of experience not to be neglected in preparing world organizations. If they are neglected some form of hypocritical idealization will inevitably ensue.

It is clear that several other forms of League might have been considered. Leagues could have been arranged in terms of standard of civilization, of geographical or racial relation, of actual or potential power, of religious principle or of self-preserved organization. The factors of geographical and racial relations in particular ought to have been examined. When we talk of the Yellow Peril we admit that a Yellow League is a possibility. If we arm the Abyssinians we are tacitly recommending the Kaffir to start a Black League in Africa. In other words the World League being itself a form of alliance canonized the principle of making alliances. The enthusiastic adherent to

League ideals, driven by his fear or detestation of the bad old times, simply turned his back on the whole question of transitional organizations, hoping no doubt that if he could fix his eyes firmly enough on the future the present would take care of itself. We are now in process of discovering that it cannot be left to take care of itself.

And this brings me to what is perhaps the most fatal objection to current ideas about the League. The fact is that no sooner do we give a focus to ideals than the processes of myth formation begin to operate. And the less our conduct approximates to an ideal demand the more feverish does the manufacture of myths become.* If one suggests that the League ideal leads to neglect of current realities the usual answer is—oh, but the League is extremely busy with current realities. A variant of this attitude is contained in the suggestion that the alternative to existing League operations is a return to the bad old times with a certainty of disaster to come. These

* Nowhere are the infantile origins of myth formations more clearly demonstrated than in the case of the League. Perhaps the simplest form is to be detected in the cartoons of Low of the *Evening Standard*. To represent a Committee of somewhat fly-blown Foreign Secretaries as a beautiful lady with bare feet is an exact example of a Mother-myth. In other instances the Father Image is singled out. In the leading columns of certain pacifist periodicals and the sermons of some divines this Committee is identified with God. The cartoonist (editor, or divine) represents of course the Son, the good boy of the family.

are very specious assumptions. They suggest in the first place that the League is actually working, that we are for the moment out of the bad old times. With this emotional lever it is possible to stampede many whose fears are as intense as their hopes are sanguine. The questions which require careful answer are—have we ever left the bad old times, and if we have actually initiated a new system is it working well or ill?

I am going to suggest that the view that the League idea is functioning is for the most part a myth. Take the most recent example, the case of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. If anything is clear in this complicated world it is clear that the League is a convenient cover for the self-interest of all the nations concerned. Not simply for enlightened self-interest, for that might well be an excuse—though not a very good excuse—for League activities. The customary view that a chain is as strong as its weakest link does not hold in this case. The League is as weak as its strongest links. In other words the League has from the first depended upon the whims of the strongest and potentially most war-ready of the individual nations. Naturally great play has been made with the number of constituent members. But this fact deceives no one. Certainly the main powers find themselves surrounded at Geneva by a fry of small powers. But they know quite well that these little powers have either joined the League

in the hope of protecting their countries or of securing some hypothetical benefits. This is specially true of the newly formed nations, but it is also true of the older-established small nationalities. They feel that they have something to gain and they have nothing to lose—up to the present at any rate. Caustic permanent officials at Geneva, who were no doubt in their day enthusiastic internationalists, have often remarked that the more earnest the protestations of fidelity to the League the more certain it is that the delegate represents an unimportant country. This is not quite fair, because it has always been the habit of the stronger powers to make ceremonially idealistic speeches once a year. But in other respects the comment is just.

To return to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, it is notorious that despite all protestations to the contrary the larger powers were less concerned with ideals of League control than with plain self-interest. The sudden change of face of the British Government was in itself highly significant. From throwing cold water on collective action it turned to lauding the procedure to the skies. And the rather hysterical agitation it displayed earlier in the summer, when most other nations were taking the situation with almost cynical indifference, suggested very clearly what was subsequently denied officially, that the Foreign Office had some reason to be disturbed. If any doubt remained in the mind of the most

unoriented observer it should have been dispelled by the behaviour of France during later negotiations. It was hardly a question of reading between the lines, for M. Laval had practically got to the stage of thinking aloud about France's self-interest. In addition to all this the hopes and fears of countries like Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Rumania could be read on the run—Germany in particular had scarcely troubled to conceal what its intentions were with regard to Italy when in the ripeness of time it felt ready to strike. In short, it was plain that the post-war attitudes of individual nations were no different from their pre-war reactions. In these circumstances one is forced to account in a more realistic way for the sudden devotion to League ideals.

Now it is already a habit among journalistic historians to refer to this change as 'turning' to the League, implying of course that in the sense of effective action the League did actually exist. But really this is rather a reckless assumption. Take, for example, the League action on the matter of Japan. This has frequently been referred to as a fiasco. But it is unfair to the League to call it a fiasco; it was simply a plain measure of the League's lack of capacity when it is not backed by the self-interest of the most powerful war-nations. It was a proof that in the sense of effective function the League had simply never existed. It didn't do anything for

the old-fashioned reason that it couldn't. But you may say "even if the League has never really had any backing from war-nations, as soon as it gets this backing it begins to fulfil its founders' hopes. It becomes an effective League. Just think of fifty odd nations imposing sanctions on Italy." And so on. This line of thought is surely inspired by sanguine hopes. Even if sanctions prove effective, this will only go to show that a new form of self-preservation has developed amongst the larger nations which might well be described as hoodwinking the smaller ones.*

* At the time of going to press the famous 'sanctions' muddle has not yet been cleared up. But it is already apparent that the historian of the future will have some justification for regarding it as the most tragi-comic of a long series of absurd 'peace' plans. In particular the suggested embargo on exporting oil to Italy shows up at the same time the degree to which the League had neglected its proper functions and the strength of the Chauvinistic forces behind the League. Practically all the important nations within and without the League are well supplied with oil. In some cases the supply has been secured through the ordinary channels of imperialistic expansion. Practically all these nations are Chauvinist in policy. The one nation within the League which boasts of not being Chauvinist is by force of circumstance the most nationalistic of all. Russia may claim that the ultimate aim of Communism is international. Possibly so, but the more isolated Russia is in respect of its Communistic faith the more obviously it is, for the time being at any rate, a country with strong nationalist aims. At the moment Russia is just as Chauvinist as America.

Now the ostensible aims of the oil embargo are to prevent

There can be no question that the existence of the League at the present moment depends entirely on the hopes and fears of Britain and France. If we may borrow the language of pre-war jingoism, it is always conceivable that the British Lion, feeling a little of the stiffness of middle age, and rather anxious as to the state of its gums, is now ready to eschew carnivorous diet, hoping thereby that it will receive material support in future necessities from a younger generation of nations. Even so it is doubtful if Britain would have ventured so far as it has done in the case of a power stronger than Italy. It was certainly tempting to try out the new

war, and by crippling the aggressor to indicate to all future Covenant breakers that the League's will to peace is strong. Apart from the fact that the plan may in itself spread war rather than limit it, the situation is absurd to a degree. If we accept the views of war-causation current amongst these nations then one of the obvious causes of Italy's drive to Colonial expansion is the lack of vital natural resources. This fact has been notorious for years, yet so far from the League doing its obvious duty in the matter by having a permanent commission to investigate and rectify oil distribution, it has frittered away its time talking of disarmament. And now the Chauvinist nations well supplied with oil are playing with the idea of rubbing it in. For the action if carried out will indicate not only to Italy but to all future Covenant breakers the necessity of laying up a good store of oil. In short, a broad hint to Germany. Of course it would be very nice if a humiliated nation decided to kiss the rod and be a good boy in future. Very nice, but if we are to judge from individual psychology, to say nothing of the effects of the Treaty of Versailles, not very likely.

form of warfare on a comparatively weak country. It was all the more tempting to exploit domestic feeling in favour of the new scheme; to harness anti-Fascist feeling to a pacifist drive and then exploit the pacifist drive to secure national ends through an alleged international organization. Whatever the result of the new policy it cannot redound to the credit of the League. If it fails the League will get the discredit; if it succeeds it will be a triumph for secret Chauvinistic diplomacy.

The simplest theoretical considerations would suggest that even if League ideals could ultimately be attained a transitional phase would inevitably occur when the actions of the League would differ little from the actions of an independent alliance. And in fact there is little or nothing to distinguish the manœuvrings at Geneva from the conduct of any secret alliance. Representatives of the war powers have met in secret conclave in the bed-sitting-rooms of Geneva. True the smaller urchins have flattened their noses on the windows of these private Council chambers, but apart from some guesswork they have learned no more than is good for them. And the League officials are just as helpless. A significant jerk of the thumb is the utmost they can vouchsafe the most inquisitive journalist. Of all the Chauvinistic outposts at Geneva perhaps the most curiously disguised is the British. By creating a special Minister for League

Affairs the National Government sought to establish its League bona fides to other nations and to its own countrymen. Needless to say the countrymen are more impressed than the nations. It is no disparagement of Mr. Anthony Eden or of his personal convictions to say that as an official representative his status has been pretty shrewdly assessed by the diplomatic representatives of the more realistically minded European countries.

I have mentioned only a few of the simpler features of the situation. But there is no need to elaborate the matter. A moment's consideration will show that what we are inclined to call our objective views on League affairs are in the nature of inferences drawn from incomplete data and reinforced by emotional bias. As comparative outsiders we cannot draw from the secret sources of information available to Foreign Secretaries, but we are not debarred from forming opinions. Indeed we are encouraged to form opinions, particularly by pacifists who wish us to echo their views. There is fortunately one advantage in being a comparative outsider. Viewing affairs from a distance we are less likely to be bamboozled, as journalists are by ante-chamber gossip, or as diplomats are by personal contact with other delegates. The difference between those who support present League policies with blind enthusiasm and those who feel that they represent an actual or potential danger to peace,

is that their emotional preconceptions differ. Those who are emotionally devoted to the League idea hope that events will turn out well. Those who question the depth of modification of human impulse are not inclined to share this optimism. But in either case the conclusions arrived at are biassed by hope or fear. Another difference is that League protagonists have marshalled the forces of righteousness on their side. By championing League idealizations they acquire virtue, and promptly endeavour to put everyone else in the wrong by questioning their motives. This technique does not make their conclusions any more valid. But it does make them more palatable to a great number of people who like to feel themselves in the right. In recent years there have been quite a few large-scale experiments designed to ease the guilt tensions of individuals through social organizations. To some extent the Russian experiment in Communism is a venture in this direction. The League of Nations organization is another. It remains to be seen whether it will act as a reality institution or as a mere placebo to the disgruntled idealism of individuals.

The whole situation is a gamble in human probabilities. And the safest way of preparing for a gamble is to estimate these probabilities as accurately as possible. The greatest obstacle to accurate estimation is the existence of preconceived ideals which are in the long run only laudable wishes. For

example, most enthusiasts are inclined to think that although the League may have setbacks it will maintain its existence and gradually build up strength. Apart from pious hopes there is no particular justification for this view. Mathematically regarded the situation is simply that it may continue to exist or that again it may not. That it may be destroyed for prolonged periods and revived in some altered form seldom enters into the calculations of those who take sides. Yet if we take the view that at present the most powerful war-nations supporting the League are moved by secret ambitions or fears, it is obvious that this support cannot be very wholehearted, and then when their ambitions are realized and their immediate fears allayed, they will leave the League in the gimcrack state in which they first supported it. This would in all probability involve the destruction of the League for the time being. In any case there is no certainty that the League idea will prevail. It may be doomed to destruction. All we know for certain is that those who support the League idea hope that it will continue. They can also be depended on to strive for its existence. But an ill-timed piece of striving, such as premature war, may actually accelerate its destruction. There are two sides to a gamble. Win or lose. The last people to take part in initiating an international gamble should be pacifists with an enthusiastic conviction of the justness of their

cause. One of the greatest dangers which our civilization runs is undisciplined idealization. The experience of individual psychology in this matter should not be neglected. When man sets for himself standards which are at the time beyond his attainment there is no certainty that he will compromise by going a little part of the way. He is just as likely to have a nervous breakdown and go no part of the way. Those who have the interests of peace at heart should not neglect an obvious duty. Having excluded the biasing influence of pious hopes they should endeavour to estimate the chances of a League organization surviving. The League has had the worst of all possible starts. It was founded by a rigid-minded idealist, its organization was set up in the worst of all possible times in the phase of reaction to a great war, and in the teeth of national opposition. It was in effect tied up with the maintenance of a peace treaty which was itself forged in panic, and its immediate organization was determined by existing concepts of nationalism. This is bad enough in all conscience, but it is not necessarily hopeless. It might be possible to eradicate the more objectionable features of its organization. But any effective amendment must be based on psychological realities. A little more modesty, a little less truculence and a little less expansive self-righteousness on the part of its supporters would go far to induce conditions favourable to its continued existence. This,

however, would necessitate some capacity to face objective truth. And a capacity to face truth is one of those human virtues whose immediate reward is mental discomfort, a by no means alluring prospect.

APPENDIX II

ON VOTING AT GENERAL ELECTIONS

I HAVE suggested that the vote by ballot is a confession of fear. I am well aware that historically the precaution was justified up to the hilt, and that even yet it is well to afford protection to those who are liable to economic or emotional intimidation. In short, to protect those who are either in real danger or fearful of it. I agree further that the vote by ballot enhances the average person's sense of mental decency and privacy. Most of us without realizing it react to mental functions in the same way as we react to bodily functions, a fact which no doubt accounts for the characteristic arrangement of polling booths. Yet I maintain that the system is psychologically pernicious. It obstructs the development of sane and objective reactions to political issues. I believe that it would add to the decency of public affairs if those who have no reason to be afraid were to make a habit of being quite open about their political behaviour. I propose therefore to describe briefly on what conscious grounds I decided to vote in the Election of November 1935.

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find myself disinclined to vote. I am inclined to think that in the long run it makes little or no difference to the fundamental movements of society. These proceed more or less independently of the expressed opinions of individuals. I admit, however, that it is a matter of more or less. And there are occasions when a sense of expediency overcomes the disinclination. In particular when it appears that one or more immediate issues are likely to be determined by the result of the Election. In the case of the 1935 Election there were two obvious and urgent issues, one external the other domestic. The external issue was the issue of war or peace; the domestic problem was the problem of economic depression with its consequent low standard of living for a large section of the community.

I am aware that in the view of many the most important issue was that of disarmament. Increase in British armament, it was held, might obstruct the League of Nations policy of the Government and at the same time disturb the processes of economic recovery. I have never been very much impressed by the stock arguments on this subject. It is so easy to put up an apparently good case. Since wars break out in any case one can never exclude any sort of contributing cause. If one cared to argue that it is dangerous to import such missiles as foreign tomatoes and Chinese eggs, an equally common-sense case could be made out. I do not

suggest that the argument is entirely groundless. I think it has about the same validity as the opposite view that a sound policy of defensive armament is likely to reduce the chances of war. Incidentally it is the custom of pacifists to jeer at this reversal of their position, but they have really little reason to jeer. What after all could be more fatuous than the 'merchants of death' campaign of certain pacifist newspapers? The attempt to fasten responsibility for war on the instruments of war is dangerous. It obscures the true dynamic factors in war making.

To return, having decided that the main issues were, externally, peace or war and, internally, economic depression, it remained to decide which of these was the more urgent. My personal view was that the issue of war or peace was the more urgent. My next assumption, for naturally the individual can only make assumptions, was that it would be advantageous if the date of the next European war could be delayed. This is not an entirely easy assumption to make, for it may be argued that delay will make things worse in the long run. Perhaps so, but how long will that run be? Again a difficult question to answer. Presumably until the most powerful, aggressive, frightened or revengeful nation is likely to strike. But what nation? Presumably Germany in Europe, possibly Japan in Asia. Russia? Not so certain as the other two.

Would a war precipitated now hold off Germany for thirty years? Surely a gamble. Because if war spread an actually weak Germany might become comparatively strong. Faced with these and innumerable other uncertainties it seemed urgent to come to some decision. For better or for worse it seemed desirable to delay the next big war. But what about the unfortunate Abyssinians? Should they be thrown to the wolves? At the time the issue was in doubt. The Abyssinians, aided by the conditions of their own country and the domestic state of Italy, might even win their war. Even if they didn't, which would be the greater threat to peace, an exploited union of barbaric and primitive tribes or a premature European war? Was there any certainty that England or its allies would win the premature war? None whatever.

Having arrived at this provisional conclusion the next step was easy. Of all the political parties, which was the most likely to delay a big European outbreak? Obviously the Conservative Party, or National Government as it was called, on the strength of having a few diminutive allies. But why the Conservative Party? Because of all the parties at the time it was the least committed to stirring up war conditions. True the National Government for some obscure reason or other had been behaving in a provocative and almost hysterical manner for some months. But gradually it had toned down

this hysteria, and although it still maintained a rather unctuous and singularly ill-becoming attitude on the subject of international ethics, that could be discounted as in large part window-dressing. On the other hand the Radical, Pacifist and Socialist press had evidently a bad attack of fire-eating. The record of the Socialist leaders in the matter of the Sino-Japanese war was a bad one. And there seemed every chance that the return of a Left wing party to power would increase the danger of war in the immediate future.

But this conclusion did not solve the problem. The Conservative Party was for the moment the best of a bad lot, but should one therefore actually vote for their candidate? Against action was the fact that the existing Conservative majority was a huge one. It is generally held that this is an unhealthy state of affairs. Actually it is unhealthy only so long as political opinions swing between extremes. There is a huge majority in favour of the view that the water supply of the country should be free from dangerous bacteria. But it is not an unhealthy majority. Nevertheless with a large majority for the Right, there was a great deal to be said for voting for the Left in spite of its reactionary war policy. On the other hand it was practically certain that a swing to the Left would take place in any case and would reduce the majority to roughly two hundred. So everything seemed to suggest that there

was no need to vote at all! A decision not to vote would be reinforced by the unimaginative policy of the Right in the matter of economic depression. After all it is easy enough for the Left to talk in grandiose terms of a new and for the most part untried economic organization of society. That is what one expects from the Left. And if you vote for that scheme you do so with your eyes open. It may be a good scheme in the long run or it may not, but it is certain to be a bad one in the first instance if only because the Right has enormous powers of sabotage. In other words if you throw in your lot with the Left you gamble your present against the future. That is why it is so significant that political majorities are not permanently on the Left. For economically speaking the great bulk of any population have not much to lose in a gamble. It is all the more disappointing when a Right party with a huge majority shows an almost entire lack of vision. With such a large majority everything is in favour of an imaginative and courageous approach to economic problems. Moreover, the Right can cajole or bully so-called vested interests to more purpose than any other party. And it is merely pusillanimous to hide political fear behind the usual vote-catching attitude of 'sound and cautious finance' to choose one out of many Conservative slogans.

These reasons were sufficient to offset the first

inclination to vote Conservative. It only remained to observe as far as one could the trend of political feeling in order to estimate the size of the majority. So long as an effective Conservative majority appeared likely there was no reasonable cause to add to it. At this point the matter was settled by the attitude of the Radical press. Not only did their optimism apparently rise as the election drew near—although of course this might have been merely a question of tactics—but it was openly suggested that with a narrow majority the Government might be more easily bullied about Sanctions. This meant greater risk of a premature European war. Avoidance of this contingency was for me the prime political consideration of the moment. So I decided to vote Conservative.

One last consideration remained. The electoral division in which I was qualified to vote was a 'safe' Conservative seat. The candidate was likely to romp home with a large majority. Why trouble to vote? The answer was obvious. After the Peace Ballot great play was made with the total figures obtained despite the fact that this total was the result of assiduous propaganda on the part of the returning officers! If the pro-war Pacifist combinations did not reduce the majority as much as they hoped, they would certainly use the aggregate vote as a lever to influence the Government in directions they desired. The mere threat was sufficient.

Even the candidate's uninspired and hackneyed election address could not prevent me voting for him.

There are of course occasions when the main electoral issue is exclusively domestic. As a rule it is some problem of economic organization. In such instances the policies of both Right and Left are not of a sort likely to appeal to the non-party voter. The alternative then is either to vote with a view to correcting extreme swings of the political pendulum, or not to vote at all. The first step in the direction of sane politics is to curb the follies of political extremists. And one of the best ways of doing this is to play them at their own game of Rights and Lefts. One cannot of course expect to disrupt political parties, but one needn't fall in with their quasi-religious extravagances. The failure of so-called Third parties or New parties is due to neglect of this obvious consideration. Third parties ape the manners of the very organizations they despise. Even self-disenfranchisement is more effective than the formation of new parties, because if carried three parts of the way to its logical conclusion it would cause a political revolution without the loss of a drop of ink.

I believe that in the long run there can be only two main parties in any country: the party concerned with the interests of the existing generation and the party concerned with the interests of the

oncoming generation, or as I would prefer to call it, the Culture Transmission party. The interests of both these parties may coincide in some respects but they may be in complete opposition in others. This is a fact which Socialists and Communists ought to take into account more carefully. It would explain some political phenomena which usually puzzle them. Yet another fundamental cleavage in parties is the cleavage between those who favour inhibition of human instinct and those who favour a reduction in the more stupid, that is to say useless, ill-adapted and excessive inhibitions. Present-day parties do not yet show very clear signs of this cleavage, although it is to be noted that Socialist, and in other European countries Clerical, groups are addicted to many of the more stupid forms of inhibition. The Left wing is usually surrounded by all the crank groups or 'anti' societies of the time. In this respect it has fallen heir to the faddist extravagances characteristic of the 'Liberal' Party in its palmier days. Indeed, it is interesting to reflect that a party which in course of time developed a consistently illiberal attitude on a great number of human issues should have gone down to history as a 'liberal' party. If economic problems became less pressing these fundamental differences would soon emerge. It is a thankless and fruitless task to remind the average citizen of his duties. But if there is one political duty more obvious

than another, it certainly is a quiet but persistent attack on those superstitious political forms which go by the names of Party Organizations. Only by abolishing these primitive remainders can we hope to hasten the coming of Political Science.

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